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The debate over whether tax privacy—a set of statutory rules that prohibits
the federal government from publicly releasing any taxpayer’s tax return—
promotes individual tax compliance is as old as the income tax itself. It dates
back to the Civil War and resurfaces often, especially when the government
seeks innovative ways to collect tax revenue more effectively. For over 150
years, the tax privacy debate has followed predictable patterns. Both sides
have fixated on the question of how a taxpayer would comply with the tax
system if he knew other taxpayers could see his personal tax return. Neither
side, however, has addressed the converse question: How would seeing other
taxpayers’ returns affect whether a taxpayer complies? This Article probes
that unexplored question and, in doing so, offers a new defense of individual
tax privacy: that tax privacy enables the government to influence individuals’
perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities by publicizing specific examples
of its tax-enforcement strengths without exposing specific examples of its taxenforcement weaknesses. Because salient examples may implicate well-known
cognitive biases, this strategic-publicity function of tax privacy can cause
individuals to develop an inflated perception of the government’s ability to
detect tax offenses, punish their perpetrators, and compel all but a few outliers
to comply. Without the curtain of tax privacy, by contrast, individuals could
see specific examples of the government’s tax-enforcement weaknesses that
would contradict this perception. After considering this new defense of
individual tax privacy in the context of deterrence and reciprocity models of
taxpayer behavior, I argue that the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy
likely encourages individuals to report their taxes properly and that it should
be exploited to enhance voluntary compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
The IRS has always been like the Wizard of Oz in some respects: you
lift up the curtain and you see the ropes and pulleys. It appears to be
all-powerful and all-seeing, yet it really isn’t.
—Jerome Kurtz
1
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1977–1980)

The debate over whether tax privacy promotes individual tax compliance is
as old as the income tax itself.2 In 1862, when Congress first instituted the
income tax to pay for the Civil War, it required the names of taxpayers and
their tax liabilities to be open to public inspection.3 Since then, Congress has
repealed,4 enacted,5 and repealed again6 similar measures, each time after
vigorous discussion of the relationship between tax privacy and individual tax
compliance. Today, our tax privacy rules prohibit the federal government from
publicly releasing the details of any specific taxpayer’s tax return or audit
history unless the taxpayer consents.7 But debate over this question resurfaces
often,8 especially when the government seeks innovative ways to address the
“tax gap,” or the difference between the amount of tax that taxpayers should
pay and the amount that they actually pay voluntarily and on time, which was
estimated at $345 billion annually in 2006.9
Defenders of tax privacy have long contended that it encourages individual
tax compliance because, without it, taxpayers would limit the information that
they disclose to the government. Because the individual tax return contains so
much sensitive personal information, defenders of tax privacy suggest that
taxpayers might feel vulnerable to embarrassment or harassment if others

1 Alex Taylor III, Testing Time for the Tax Collectors, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 1986, at 82, 82 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2 As Boris Bittker commented in 1981, this question “was not invented yesterday.” Boris I. Bittker,
Federal Income Tax Returns—Confidentiality vs. Public Disclosure, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 479, 480–81 (1981).
3 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 15, 19, 12 Stat. 432, 437, 439 (repealed 1870). Congress actually
passed the first income tax in 1861, though it went into effect in January 1862 and was repealed later that year
before any taxes were collected. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862)
4 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259.
5 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698 (repealed 1935).
6 Act of Apr. 19, 1935, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158, 158–59.
7 I.R.C. §§ 6103(a), (b)(2), (c) (2006).
8 See, e.g., Anna Bernasek, Should Tax Bills Be Public Information?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at
BU11.
9 OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING
THE TAX GAP 5–6 (2006).
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could view it.10 As a result, many defenders of tax privacy have speculated that
individual taxpayers will comply with the tax system only if they trust that
their personal tax information “stops with the government.”11
The contemporary tax-compliance literature, however, reveals palpable
skepticism toward the taxpayer-trust theory of tax privacy. Many scholars have
questioned the hypothesis that, in the absence of tax privacy, individuals would
withhold important personal information from the IRS.12 Several of these
scholars have suggested that tax privacy no longer plays as critical a role in
fostering tax compliance as it did in the past.13 By lifting the curtain of tax
privacy, these scholars argue that public access to tax return information would
cast “[m]illions of eyes”14 on tax returns, serving as an “automatic enforcement
device.”15
For over 150 years, the tax privacy debate has followed familiar patterns.
Because neither side has offered a convincing prediction of taxpayers’
reactions to the threat of public disclosure of their tax returns, the question of
whether tax privacy promotes individual tax compliance has swung back and
forth between these two sides. Both sides have fixated on the question of how a
taxpayer would comply with the tax system if she knew other taxpayers could
see her personal tax return. Neither side, however, has addressed the converse

10

See, e.g., 79 CONG. REC. 2594 (1935) (statement of Rep. Alfred Beiter).
1 OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SCOPE AND USE OF
TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 19 (2000) (attributing the quote to Andrew
Mellon).
12 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase
Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 95, 113 (2005) (proposing the enactment of a modern-day “pink
slip” statute for the public disclosure of some tax information); Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost’ for Millionaires:
Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity–Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 951 (1990–1991) (proposing the publication of millionaires’ tax returns); Stephen W. Mazza,
Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1120–43 (2003) (proposing additional
disclosure exceptions to I.R.C. § 6103); Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 895–
96 (2008) (arguing that, due to the wide availability of information about individuals, tax privacy laws’ effects
are generally reduced); Joseph J. Thorndike, Show Us the Money, 123 TAX NOTES 148, 148–49 (2009)
[hereinafter Thorndike, Show Us the Money] (arguing for public access to individual taxpayers’ tax returns);
Joseph J. Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, 122 TAX NOTES 691, 691–92 (2009) [hereinafter Thorndike,
The Thorndike Challenge] (arguing for the release of politicians’ tax returns); Bernasek, supra note 8 (quoting
Professor Laurence J. Kotlikoff as saying that “[d]isclosure could be an automatic enforcement device”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
13 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 101–03; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 895–96; Thorndike, The
Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691.
14 Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691.
15 Bernasek, supra note 8 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Professor Kotlikoff’s statement).
11
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question: How would seeing other taxpayers’ returns affect whether a taxpayer
complies?
This Article probes that unexplored question and, in doing so, offers a new
defense of individual tax privacy: that tax privacy enables the government to
influence individuals’ perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities by
publicizing specific examples of its tax-enforcement strengths without
exposing specific examples of its tax-enforcement weaknesses. The
government publicizes specific examples whenever it reveals the details of any
named individual’s tax controversy.16 Because salient examples may implicate
well-known cognitive biases, this strategic publicity function of tax privacy
can cause individuals to develop an inflated perception of the government’s
ability to detect tax offenses, punish their perpetrators, and compel all but a
few outliers to comply. Without the curtain of tax privacy, by contrast,
individuals could see specific examples of the government’s tax-enforcement
weaknesses that would contradict this perception. After considering this new
defense of individual tax privacy in the context of deterrence and reciprocity
models of taxpayer behavior, I argue that the strategic publicity function of tax
privacy likely encourages individuals to report their taxes properly and that it
should be exploited to enhance voluntary compliance.
An initial reaction to my portrayal of tax privacy may be one of skepticism.
After all, the government releases voluminous tax-enforcement statistics to the
public every year.17 But this reaction ignores how the human brain processes
specific examples compared to anonymous statistics. Specific examples may
include a description of a person’s identifying traits, such as a name,
occupation, and physical features. Unlike anonymous statistics, these examples
may cause individuals to create vivid mental images of particular people or
events that they “see[] with the mind’s eye.”18 Drawing on behavioral research,
I show that information about specific tax-enforcement actions, where the
taxpayers are named and their tax controversies are described, are much more
likely to influence individual taxpayers than faceless tax-enforcement statistics
posted on the IRS website. Salient examples may implicate an individual
taxpayer’s cognitive biases, or mental shortcuts, that she uses to make
16

See Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 8

(2010).
17 See, e.g., IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2010 (2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10databk.pdf.
18 Marlene Behrmann, The Mind’s Eye Mapped onto the Brain’s Matter, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 50, 50 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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decisions and judgments.19 By provoking these cognitive biases, salient taxenforcement examples may influence the individual’s perceptions and beliefs
regarding certain elements of the tax system, which, in turn, may affect her
decision to comply with the tax law.
In developing my defense of individual tax privacy, I perform the following
thought experiment: I compare examples of tax enforcement involving specific
taxpayers that individuals see under our current tax privacy rules to the
examples of tax enforcement against specific taxpayers that they could see in a
regime in which all tax return information—taxpayers’ tax returns, tax
liabilities, audit statuses, and settlement agreements with the IRS—were
publicly accessible. By comparing a world with tax privacy to a world without
it, this experiment highlights the effects of tax privacy on individual taxpayers’
perceptions. I then examine the impact of these different examples on
individual tax compliance under both deterrence20 and reciprocity21 models of
taxpayer behavior.
19

For a review of a small portion of this massive body of literature, see generally RICHARD H. THALER &
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 17–39 (Penguin
Books rev. ed. 2009) (2008); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A
Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000) (arguing that, in response to
market manipulation that exploits psychological mental shortcuts, enterprise liability provides a solution); Jon
D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (detailing the evidence of market manipulation by companies seeking to
exploit psychological traits of consumers); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar,
The Problem] (suggesting the existence of market manipulation by economic actors controlling the form of
presented information and thereby exploiting consumers’ psychological traits); Howard Latin, “Good”
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (arguing that certain kinds
of product warnings may take advantage of consumers’ cognitive biases and therefore wrongfully insulate
manufacturers in tort suits); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295 (2003) (suggesting that the connection between behavioral economics and law should
be illuminated by a study of social influences’ effects on individuals’ behavior); and Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining various cognitive biases). For a
discussion of cognitive biases in the tax context, see Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1961 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Thinking About
Tax, in 96 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N 434 (2003); Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda
for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 3 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2006); and Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253
(2011).
20 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)
(discussing the deterrence justification, among others, of criminal punishment); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006)
(discussing the deterrence model and applying it to strategies to decrease tax avoidance).
21 See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo
Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 845 (1998) (applying reciprocity theory to various economics scenarios);
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By placing specific examples of strong tax-enforcement actions in front of
the curtain of tax privacy, the government plays an active role in shaping
perceptions of individual taxpayers. First, salient examples of the
government’s detection of the abusive tax activities of specific taxpayers may
cause individuals to increase their own subjective probabilities that the
government will detect them if they engage in aggressive or abusive tax
planning. The media often work in tandem with the government by publicizing
the government’s tax-enforcement actions against specific taxpayers.22 Second,
individuals may also perceive that tax penalties are significantly greater than
they are under the tax law because the government’s public announcements
and media reports regarding specific taxpayers who have received tax penalties
almost exclusively highlight criminal sanctions and high civil tax penalties.23
Finally, individuals may perceive that an IRS agent’s challenge would likely
mean a government victory in court because the government wins the
overwhelming majority of publicly announced criminal and civil tax disputes
with specific taxpayers.24
If the curtain of tax privacy were lifted, however, many contradictory
examples could appear that could alter individuals’ perceptions of the
government’s tax-enforcement capabilities. First, public access could decrease
individuals’ current perceptions of the IRS’s ability to detect abuse by enabling
the media, and ultimately ordinary citizens, to observe concrete examples of
specific celebrities, politicians, and personal acquaintances who engaged in
sophisticated tax-avoidance schemes or failed to report income, yet appeared to
escape IRS detection.25 Second, in a public-access regime, the media could
uncover memorable examples that would lower individuals’ perceptions of the
magnitude of tax penalties, such as instances in which well-known taxpayers
paid low tax penalties or entered into IRS amnesty programs without paying

Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003)
(discussing the reciprocity model and applying it to collective-action problems); Samuel Bowles & Herbert
Gintis, Is Equality Passé? Homo Reciprocans and the Future of Egalitarian Politics, BOS. REV., Dec.
1998/Jan. 1999, at 4 (explaining variations of reciprocity theory and tracing their histories).
22 See infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the availability heuristic).
23 See infra notes 194–98 and accompanying text (discussing the anchoring bias created by publicized,
strong tax penalties).
24 See infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the availability heuristic related to publicized
examples of government victories in tax controversies).
25 See infra notes 249–50 and accompanying text (discussing the availability heuristic related to public
perception of recognizable taxpayers claiming improper tax positions without facing IRS penalties or
detection).
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any tax penalties, civil or criminal.26 Last, without tax privacy, the media could
alter individuals’ perceptions of the IRS as a litigation Goliath by publicizing
specific tax controversies in which the government made legal concessions or
entered into settlements to avoid facing uncertain odds in court.27 Because the
media tend to focus closely on any missteps of the IRS,28 it would likely
disseminate these specific examples widely.
By enabling the government, with the help of the news media, to influence
individual taxpayers’ perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities, tax
privacy may bolster the government’s deterrence efforts. Because tax privacy
allows the government to publicize examples of strong tax enforcement against
specific taxpayers almost exclusively, the government may inflate taxpayers’
perceptions of the two principle determinants of deterrence: the probability of
detection and the expected costs of noncompliance.29 Without tax privacy,
examples of weak tax enforcement against specific taxpayers could surface and
have the opposite effect on individuals’ perceptions and tax-compliance
decisions.
In addition to enhancing deterrence, the strategic-publicity function of tax
privacy may also enable the government to increase confidence among
compliant individual taxpayers who are motivated by feelings of reciprocity.
According to reciprocity theory, these types of taxpayers will comply with the
tax system only if they believe that other taxpayers are paying their taxes
honestly.30 Because tax privacy primarily causes individuals to see examples of
tax enforcement that show the government catching tax cheats and subjecting
them to harsh punishment, compliant individuals may perceive that few of
their fellow taxpayers cheat and that those who do face dire consequences.
Without tax privacy, visible examples of the government’s failure to detect or
penalize noncompliant taxpayers could appear and have negative taxcompliance effects on individuals whose voluntary compliance is conditional
on that of other taxpayers.

26 See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the availability heuristic and anchoring bias created by publicized
examples of weak tax penalties).
27 See infra notes 276–77 (discussing the availability heuristic arising from publicized examples of IRS
concessions in tax controversies).
28 See infra notes 272–75 and accompanying text.
29 See sources cited supra note 20.
30 Kahan, supra note 21, at 80–85; cf. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 21, at 854–57 (discussing reciprocity
theory as it relates to the enforcement of various social norms); Bowles & Gintis, supra note 21 (discussing
reciprocity theory generally).

BLANK GALLEYSFINAL3

2011]

4/3/2012 11:56 AM

IN DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL TAX PRIVACY

273

Should we embrace tax privacy’s role in supporting the government’s
efforts to influence individuals’ perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities,
or should we pay more attention to the “man behind the curtain”?31
I offer three arguments in support of individual tax privacy and its
strategic-publicity function. First, even though tax privacy may enable the
government to influence individuals’ perceptions, it does not cause the
government to sacrifice transparency, a hallmark of liberal democracy.32
Because the government discloses actual tax-enforcement statistics on the IRS
website and in other public sources regularly, it is not guilty of deception or
dishonesty. Second, it is more politically feasible for the government to rely on
tax privacy to influence individuals’ subjective probabilities of detection and
punishment, rather than to raise actual tax penalties or audit rates.33 Finally,
the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may have a beneficial effect on
“tax morale,” or the “intrinsic motivation” of citizens to cooperate with the
government and pay taxes,34 by preserving individuals’ trust in the government
and its ability to deliver goods and services.35 For these reasons, the strategicpublicity function of tax privacy should be exploited as a means of enhancing
voluntary compliance.
Potential objections to my defense of individual tax privacy include that the
strategic-publicity function of tax privacy causes the government to act in a
paternalistic manner, which some may view as a threat to individuals’ freedom
of choice,36 that it invites uninformed public debate over tax reform, and that it
presents a risk of harm to the government’s credibility.37
None of these objections, however, is strong enough to outweigh the
potential tax-compliance benefits of the strategic-publicity function of tax
privacy. The primary implication of my analysis, consequently, is that
individual tax return information should remain private except when the
government engages in a public tax-enforcement action against an individual
31 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939) (Dorothy: “Who are you?” Oz’s Voice: “Oh—I—
Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain. Go—before I lose my temper! The Great and Powerful—Oz—
has spoken!”).
32 See infra notes 333–49 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 353–68 and accompanying text.
34 Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136,
140 (2007).
35 See infra notes 365–83.
36 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note
19, at 355.
37 See infra Part III.B.2–3.
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taxpayer. After providing support for my defense of individual tax privacy and
responding to potential objections, I consider its implications for proposals to
publicize individual tax return information that have been offered in recent
years.
Before proceeding, I should emphasize that the analysis in this Article is
confined to the effects of tax privacy on individual tax compliance. As a result
of significant differences between corporations and individuals,38 I do not
examine the effect of tax privacy on tax compliance by corporate taxpayers
here. Further, because my primary objective in this Article is to investigate
how tax privacy affects the tax-compliance decisions of individual taxpayers, I
do not examine tort, constitutional, and other justifications for tax privacy or
for a right to privacy generally.39
The remainder of this Article is presented as follows: Part I reviews the
debate over the relationship between tax privacy and individual tax
compliance. Part II presents the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy and
applies it to deterrence and reciprocity models of tax compliance. Part III
offers normative support for the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy,
addresses potential objections, and outlines possible implications.
I. THE TAX PRIVACY DEBATE
Proposals to make all or a portion of individual income tax returns publicly
accessible have appeared frequently throughout the history of the United
States, particularly when the government has sought innovative ways to collect
38 For general discussion on this point, see V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose
Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1497–1512 (1996) (describing differences between individual
criminal liability and corporate criminal liability). In the tax-compliance context, special considerations
include the inside knowledge of corporate tax directors regarding IRS tax-enforcement practices, lack of
personal liability for tax penalties at issue, noncompliance that is observable from a corporate tax return
compared to an individual tax return, and preexisting public access to information regarding the tax affairs of
other corporations from sources other than tax returns. I may reexamine my analysis of tax privacy and tax
compliance in the context of corporate taxpayers in future work. In addition, as a result of differences between
individuals and tax-exempt organizations, I do not consider the tax-compliance effects of the publication of
IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM
INCOME TAX (2010).
39
For discussion, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (describing constitutional
“zones of privacy”); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960) (stating elements of privacy
under tort law); and Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 211
(1890) (arguing that the common law right to privacy protects each individual’s “inviolate personality”). For
further history on the right to privacy, see generally Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy,
21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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tax revenue more effectively. Debate over these proposals always addresses the
question of whether tax privacy causes individuals to be more or less likely to
comply with the tax system. This Part reviews the evolution of tax privacy
from the Civil War to the present, summarizes the traditional justification for
tax privacy as a means of encouraging individual tax compliance, and
describes—then critiques—recent opposition to the traditional justification.
A. The Evolution of Tax Privacy
Public access to individual tax return information in the United States has
fluctuated widely over time, ranging from broad accessibility when the income
tax was first introduced40 to the extensive restrictions on public disclosure that
are in effect today.41
The Civil War. As the financial costs of the Civil War mounted and
borrowing became an unsustainable source of funding,42 Congress enacted the
nation’s first income tax in 186143 and added public-access provisions in
1862.44 Soon after creating the new tax system, Congress required the
Commissioner to permit public inspection of complete tax returns and the
“proceedings of the assessors.”45
Within the next two years, major newspapers began publishing the details
of individuals’ tax returns. By 1865, the New York Times regularly published a
front-page feature titled Our Internal Revenue, which listed the income tax
liabilities of prominent New Yorkers.46 A July 8, 1865 feature, for example,
listed the tax liabilities of rich and famous citizens such as William B. Astor
($1.3 million), Cornelius Vanderbilt ($576,551), and Samuel Lord
40

See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 15, 19, 12 Stat. 432, 437, 439 (repealed 1870).
I.R.C. § 6103 (2006). For detailed discussion of the history of public access to tax returns, see
HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HJ5001A, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TAX RETURN
CONFIDENTIALITY: SECTION 6103 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AND ITS PREDECESSORS (1974);
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N, THE CITIZEN AS TAXPAYER 1–3, 25–28, 54 (1977); Richard D. Pomp,
The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L.
REV. 373, 378–405 (1993); and Schwartz, supra note 12, at 884–87.
42 See ZARITSKY, supra note 41, at 3; JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 67 (1985).
43 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862).
44 Act of July 1, 1862 §§ 15, 19.
45 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228.
46 See, e.g., Our Internal Revenue: The Eighth Collection District and Its Official Lists, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 1865, at 1; Our Internal Revenue: The Fifth Collection District in Full, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1865, at 5;
Our Internal Revenue: The Sixth Collection District in Full, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1865, at 5; Our Internal
Revenue: The Third (Brooklyn) District Complete, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1865, at 1.
41
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($183,630).47 The paper’s editors noted that they chose to publish only
information that was “not a source of annoyance to the parties concerned,”
rather than publishing entire income tax returns “for the gratification of an idle
or morbid curiosity.”48
In just a few years, however, public support for the income tax waned and
so too did support for making returns public. Congress prohibited the
publication of income tax return information in 1870,49 just before repeal of the
income tax itself.50
Early Twentieth Century. The issue of tax privacy next arose in the early
twentieth century, shortly after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified to
authorize an income tax.51 In 1913, Congress instructed that all tax returns
would be open to public inspection, subject to an order of the President under
rules prescribed by the Treasury Secretary.52 In 1924, progressive U.S.
Senators expanded public access by spearheading legislation that permitted the
public to view the amount of income tax paid by every taxpayer.53
Throughout late 1924 and much of 1925, individuals’ tax return
information received extensive coverage in the press. After months of
anticipation,54 on October 24, 1924—the day after the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue released the tax lists—the New York Times published a frontpage article titled, in large, bold letters, INCOME TAX RETURNS MADE
PUBLIC; J.D. ROCKEFELLER JR. PAID $7,435,169 and subtitled Anyone

47 Our Internal Revenue: The Sixth Collection District in Full, supra note 46, at 5. Citizens were also
eager to review the performance of the local tax collector, especially when they felt that he was avoiding audits
of certain taxpayers. For example, in 1865, after reviewing the list of published tax return information in the
newspaper, one reader wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times, titled Women’s Income Taxes, which
expressed dismay at the IRS’s apparent lack of tax audits of female taxpayers, even though they may have
been capable of enabling tax evasion by others. Letter to the Editor, Women’s Income Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1865, at 2.
48 Our Internal Revenue: The Sixth Collection District in Full, supra note 46, at 5.
49 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259. Congress reaffirmed this prohibition when it
later reinstated the income tax in 1894. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509, 557–59.
50 Act of July 14, 1870 § 6 (providing that the income tax would expire in 1872).
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
52 Act of Oct. 8, 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(d), 38 Stat. 114, 177.
53 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 253, 293; see also MARK LEFF, THE LIMITS OF
SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–1939, at 67 (1984) (describing the legislative
policies behind the 1924 Act).
54 See, e.g., W.M. Kiplinger, New “Peeping Tom” Law Worries the Taxpayer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
1924, at 6 (anticipating the coming law publicizing tax information).
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Who Calls at Collector’s Office May See the Returns Made for 1923.55 The
article reported on the tax liabilities of prominent citizens, including
Rockefeller, Henry Ford, J.P. Morgan, and Charles M. Schwab.56 On the next
day, the Chicago Daily Tribune published an article, titled Movie Salary Lists
Revealed by Tax Payment,57 that included estimates of the taxable incomes of
Hollywood icons, including Douglas Fairbanks, Charlie Chaplin, and Gloria
Swanson.58 In noting the low taxable incomes of certain well-known actors,59
the article predicted that “[t]he returns may prove a sharp shock to those who
in the past have listened to tales by press agents on the salaries of the various
stars.”60
The Treasury Department, headed by Secretary Andrew Mellon (who paid
the most income tax of Pittsburgh residents in 1923),61 and President Calvin
Coolidge vigorously opposed the publication of tax return information.62 Amid
their persistent lobbying efforts, in February of 1926, Congress enacted a new
statute that required the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make public lists
of names and addresses, but not the tax liabilities, of all persons who filed
income tax returns.63
The Pink-Slip Requirement. The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression caused Congress to consider public access to income tax returns
once again, this time as a way to prevent tax evasion and the exploitation of tax
loopholes.64
55 Income Tax Returns Made Public; J.D. Rockefeller Jr. Paid $7,435,169; Ford Family and Company
Pay $19,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1924, at 1.
56 Id.; accord Income Revelation Stirs Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at 1 (canvassing the
reactions of various citizens upon the publication of taxpayer information); La Follette Hails Publicity of
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1924, at 3 (discussing the release of tax information and the leads it provided for
the investigation of tax evaders); New York—Its Big Income, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at 2 (listing a variety
of New Yorkers’ tax information).
57 Movie Salary Lists Revealed by Tax Payment, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 25, 1924, at 3.
58 Id.
59 Id. (noting the 1923 salaries of Cecil B. De Mille—$741—and Eric von Stroheim—$321—among
others).
60 Id. In 1925, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the public-access law in the face of a statutory challenge.
United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378, 385–86 (1925).
61 Movie Salary Lists Revealed by Tax Payment, supra note 57, at 2 (reporting Mellon’s tax paid for 1923
as $1,173,987).
62 See Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong. 8–9, 107
(1925) (statements of Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, and M.L. Seidman, Member, New York
Board of Trade and Transportation).
63 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 257(e), 44 Stat. 9, 51 (amended 1934).
64 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law: How a “Common Man” Campaign
Ended a Rich Man’s Law, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 129–30 (2010).
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While the Senate again passed legislation that would have allowed for the
publication of tax returns in full,65 the legislative compromise in 1934 was a
single sheet of paper known as the “pink slip.”66 As a result of the 1934
legislation, each taxpayer was required to attach to her annual federal income
tax return a pink sheet of paper that contained her name and address, total
gross income, total deductions, net income, total credits, and tax liability.67 The
pink slip, and not the entire tax return, would be open to public inspection.68
Opposition to the pink-slip requirement was fierce. In early 1935, a
conservative group called the “Sentinels of the Republic” launched a campaign
to repeal the law.69 Opponents warned repeatedly that the pink-slip
requirement would aid kidnappers.70 At the same time, the nation’s citizens
were mesmerized by the trial of Bruno Hauptmann, who was charged with the
kidnapping and murder of the infant son of famous aviators Charles and Anne
Morrow Lindbergh.71 After a surge of public outcry, Congress repealed the law
in April 193572 before it went into full effect.73
The Nixon Administration. Congress did not revisit the issue of public
access to tax return information until the years immediately following
impeachment proceedings against President Richard M. Nixon. In its articles
of impeachment, the House Judiciary Committee charged that President Nixon
had sought to use the IRS—and, specifically, tax return information—for
illegal ends.74 According to the Committee, the Nixon Administration regularly
requested tax return information regarding specific individuals, including thenGovernor George Wallace and the head of the Democratic National
Committee.75 The impeachment proceedings76 and subsequently released audio
65

See LEFF, supra note 53, at 67–68.
Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 130 (explaining the publicity provision of the Revenue Act of 1934
§ 55(b)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 135–38; Raymond Pitcairn, The Pink-Slip Strike, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, June 8, 1935, at 23, 44.
70 See 79 CONG. REC. 2594 (1935) (statement of Rep. Alfred Beiter); Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 140–
41; Income Publicity Called Kidnap Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1935, at 2.
71 See LLOYD C. GARDNER, THE CASE THAT NEVER DIES: THE LINDBERGH KIDNAPPING 2–3 (2004);
Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 140–41.
72 Act of Apr. 19, 1935, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158.
73 See Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 129.
74 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 3 (1974).
75 Id. at 141–43.
76 Id.
66
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recordings77 exposed President Nixon’s personal requests for tax audits of
political opponents, their supporters, and other members of Nixon’s “enemies
list,”78 though the Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to comply.79
The Present. As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,80 which responded
to abuses that occurred during the Nixon administration,81 current law contains
a general presumption that tax return information and tax returns are
confidential and may not be disclosed by the IRS or other federal and state
employees except under certain circumstances.82 Section 6103 of the Internal
Revenue Code protects the confidentiality of “returns” and “return
information” and broadly defines both terms to include “any tax or information
return”; any amendments filed with the IRS;83 and any taxpayer’s identity,
income, tax deductions and credits, or audit and penalty history, among many
other items.84 Section 6103 provides, however, that its confidentiality
protections do not extend to statistics that cannot be associated with a
particular taxpayer.85
The statute contains several exceptions under which returns and return
information may be disclosed by the IRS.86 Many of these exceptions concern
tax administration, such as exceptions that permit the IRS to provide a taxpayer
with a copy of his own tax return87 or to share return information with state

77 E.g., RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT NIXON: ALONE IN THE WHITE HOUSE 369 (2002) (quoting an audio
recording of President Nixon stating, “Are we going after their tax returns? . . . Do you know what I
mean? . . . And on the IRS, you could—are we looking into Muskie’s return? . . . Hubert? Hubert’s been in a
lot of funny deals” (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78 Bob Kuttner, Dean Tells of Nixon Pressure on IRS, WASH. POST, July 19, 1974, at A9.
79 See Patricia Sullivan, IRS Chief Successfully Fought Efforts to Use Tax Audits Against Nixon Foes,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2009, at B6. Ironically, President Nixon’s own personal tax returns were riddled with
erroneous and abusive tax positions. See William D. Samson, President Nixon’s Troublesome Tax Returns,
107 TAX NOTES 635, 635–36 (2005) (detailing irregularities in Nixon’s 1969–1972 personal tax returns).
80 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
81 See IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 4638, DISCLOSURE & PRIVACY LAW REFERENCE GUIDE 17 to 1-9 (2007).
82 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2006). It is not possible to request tax return information regarding a particular
taxpayer under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
83 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1).
84 Id. § 6103(b)(2).
85 Id. Individuals who make unauthorized disclosures of returns or return information may face civil
penalties, see id. § 7431, and criminal penalties of up to five years in prison, see id. § 7413.
86 See id. §§ 6103(c)–(o).
87 Id. § 6103(c).
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taxing authorities.88 But the exceptions implicate non-tax-administration
purposes as well.89
There are limited circumstances under which the public may gain access to
a specific taxpayer’s return information. If a taxpayer is involved in a public
civil or criminal trial with the government over tax matters, the public may
learn about the taxpayer’s return information. The government currently takes
the position that, in these cases, it may publicly disclose information that has
become part of a public court record.90 Further, a taxpayer may enter into a
civil settlement agreement with the IRS and, as part of the settlement, sign a
waiver of the tax privacy protections described above.91 Last, if a taxpayer is
delinquent in paying federal income taxes, the government may file a Notice of
Federal Tax Lien on the taxpayer’s property, which publicly notifies the
taxpayer’s creditors of the government’s claim.92
B. Taxpayer Trust
The traditional justification for tax privacy has been that individuals will
disclose information to the government only if they can trust that the
government will keep this information private. Andrew Mellon contended that
taxpayers are willing to make “truthful disclosure[s]” on their tax returns
primarily because they trust that, when they reveal this information to the
government, “[i]t is like confiding in one’s lawyer.”93 This view of the purpose
of tax privacy continues to be the official position of the IRS today.94 This
section describes the most familiar arguments that tax privacy defenders have
offered in support of their hypothesis that, unless taxpayers can trust that the
government will protect their tax return information from public eyes, they will
reduce their disclosure of information to the government.

88

Id. § 6103(d).
The statute, for instance, allows the IRS to disclose tax return information to other law enforcement
agencies if the disclosure is relevant to any terrorist incident or threat. Id. § 6103(i)(3).
90 IRS, supra note 81, at 2-28. Although this issue has been disputed, several courts have sided with the
government’s position. See, e.g., Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 337 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing several
lower court decisions finding that tax information is no longer confidential once disclosed to a court).
91 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(c)-1(b) (2003), for a description of procedures that the IRS must follow in
obtaining a waiver.
92 File a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=108339,00.
html#Notice (last updated Dec. 19, 2011).
93 OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 11, at 19.
94 See IRS, supra note 81, at 1-7 (“By the single act of filing a tax return, a record is created and also a
trust.”).
89
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Harassment (or Worse). Without tax privacy, its defenders argue,
taxpayers’ fear of harassment, or even danger to their personal safety, would
weaken their incentive to cooperate with the government. Congressmen
arguing against public-access proposals have predicted that, without strong tax
privacy protections, individuals would be “hounded by . . . every kind of
person[ ]trying to get a commission selling stocks or bonds or wildcat
schemes”95 and threatened by “kidnapers[] and racketeers.”96 During the pinkslip debates of 1934 and 1935, newspapers like the Wall Street Journal ran
editorials warning that public access would expose taxpayers “to the vexatious
and in some cases dangerous attentions of mendicants, racketeers and other
varieties of unemployables.”97
Loss of Credit. Similarly, tax privacy defenders argue that public access
could cause individuals whose income tax returns reveal declining income or
business losses to encounter difficulty in borrowing from creditors. While
advocating for a law prohibiting the publication of tax return information in the
newspaper, Representative James A. Garfield (who would later be elected
President) hypothesized that, if “a man has had serious losses during the year,”
he might not be willing to disclose that information “so as to alarm his
creditors and bring them all down upon him when otherwise he would come
out safely.”98 During the pink-slip-provision debate, the House Ways and
Means Committee pointed out that, in Wisconsin, the only state that had
attempted full public access to state tax returns at the time, public access had
not raised additional tax revenue and, instead, had benefited “credit
organizations which ha[d] men on hand almost constantly digging into the
files.”99
Advantage to Business Competitors. Tax privacy encourages taxpayer trust,
Andrew Mellon and others asserted, because it shields strategic information
about the performance of a taxpayer’s business from the eyes of “rivals
95

78 CONG. REC. 2602 (1934) (statement of Rep. Allen Towner Treadway).
79 CONG. REC. 2594 (1935) (statement of Rep. Alfred Beiter).
97 Senseless Publicity, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1935, at 4; accord Walter Lippmann, Pink Dynamite, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1935, at 4 (predicting that the publication of taxpayers’ information will bring “malice, envy,
uncharitableness, as well as racketeering, extortion, kidnaping, and what not” upon the taxpayers); Press
Comment on Publicity for Income Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at 3 (suggesting that, if taxpayers’
taxes were made public, they may “become the target of all sorts of attacks, legal and otherwise, upon [their]
means and resources”).
98 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2789 (1866); cf. Kiplinger, supra note 54, at 6 (suggesting similar
hypothetical situations to demonstrate the general problem of compromised privacy).
99 THOMAS H. CULLEN, REPEAL CERTAIN PROVISIONS RELATING TO PUBLICITY OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS
OF INCOME, H.R. REP. NO. 313, at 2 (1935).
96
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and . . . those having some ulterior motive.”100 Scholars have noted that this
argument has been made in the context of sole proprietorships, like “mom and
pop” shops, rather than large corporations.101 A perennial argument of tax
privacy defenders, consequently, is that, if tax return information were publicly
accessible, taxpayers would be wary to disclose certain information that could
advantage their business competitors.
C. Sunlight and Social Norms
As the government has in recent years searched for ways to reduce the
$345 billion annual tax gap,102 a resurgence of interest in the issue of public
access to individual tax return information has occurred in the tax-compliance
literature. In addressing the tax gap, tax scholars and policymakers have once
again examined the relationship between tax privacy and tax compliance.
A review of the contemporary tax-compliance literature reveals palpable
skepticism toward the taxpayer-trust theory of tax privacy. Scholars such as
Joseph Thorndike,103 Marjorie Kornhauser,104 Laurence Kotlikoff,105 and Paul
Schwartz,106 among others,107 have questioned the hypothesis that, in the
absence of tax privacy, individuals would withhold important personal
information from the IRS. Several of these scholars have suggested that tax
privacy no longer plays as essential a role in fostering tax compliance as it did
in the past.108
Instead of a regime of tax privacy, which its opponents have described as
allowing “crime [to] thrive in the dark,”109 several of these contemporary
scholars have suggested that the government should release some or all
individual tax return information to the public. They argue that, by shining
sunlight on individuals’ tax returns, the government may encourage taxpayers

100

Cost of Publicity Scored in Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1925, at 2.
See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 41, at 377.
102 OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, supra note 11, at 6.
103 Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at 148–49; Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra
note 12, at 691–92.
104 Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 113.
105 See Bernasek, supra note 8.
106 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 895–96.
107 See, e.g., Linder, supra note 12; Mazza, supra note 12, at 1120–43.
108 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 101–03; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 883; Thorndike, The
Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691.
109 La Follette Hails Publicity of Taxes, supra note 56, at 3 (quoting Senator Robert M. La Follette).
101
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to report their taxes honestly. The following are the primary assertions they
have made in predicting taxpayer behavior.
Perceptions of Detection. Public access, its proponents have contended,
would bolster individual tax compliance by causing taxpayers to perceive that
the probability of detection by the IRS is greater than it is in a regime of tax
privacy. Kornhauser, for instance, has argued that public access to tax return
information “strengthens penalties because it increases the chance of getting
caught (since members of the public, especially tax experts, can study
returns).”110 Likewise, Thorndike has argued that a reduction in tax privacy
would decrease tax evasion by casting “[m]illions of eyes on a tax return,”111
and Kotlikoff has characterized public access as an “automatic enforcement
device.”112 These arguments are consistent with those offered by lawmakers in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that public access to tax returns
would benefit the IRS because citizens would be eager to report their friends
and neighbors to the IRS if they were cheating on their tax returns.113
Social Norms. Public-access proponents have also argued that social norms
would reduce abusive tax planning if citizens could view each other’s tax
returns. As Kornhauser has argued, a regime of public access would
“increase[] chances of public shaming for non-compliance.”114 Similarly,
Thorndike has embraced public access as a means of promoting tax
compliance by encouraging “social auditing,” which may cause individuals to
ostracize those who have cheated on their taxes.115 The implication of these
arguments is that, if tax returns were publicly accessible, individual taxpayers
would refrain from engaging in abusive tax activities out of fear of social
stigma.
This argument is almost identical to the arguments of nineteenth-century
public-access proponents. For example, when delivering an address on taxes at
the end of the nineteenth century, former President Benjamin Harrison asserted
that, because “[w]e are members of a great partnership, . . . it is the right of
each to know what every other member is contributing to the partnership.”116
110

See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 105.
See Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691.
112 Bernasek, supra note 8 (quoting Professor Kotlikoff) (internal quotation mark omitted).
113 See, e.g., 53 CONG. REC. 13,291 (1916) (statement of Sen. Paul O. Husting).
114 See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 105.
115 See Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691.
116 BENJAMIN HARRISON, The Obligations of Wealth (Feb. 22, 1898), in VIEWS OF AN EX-PRESIDENT 331,
355–56 (Mary Lord Harrison ed., 1901).
111
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Similarly, after reversing its position in the 1860s on the publication of tax
return information, the editors of the New York Times asserted that, if the press
continued to “[s]how every taxpayer’s sworn return of income to his nearest
neighbors, his most intimate friends, [and] to himself,” it would encourage tax
compliance in a way that “no laws, no oaths, and no scrutiny, has or can
furnish.”117
Willingness to Disclose. Many contemporary scholars have argued that,
because individuals disclose their tax return information to multiple parties
other than the IRS today, public access would not have a significant chilling
effect on their willingness to disclose information on their tax returns.118 In
commenting on the importance of tax privacy in modern times, Kornhauser has
asked, “Why should tax information remain confidential in a world where
privacy has been so constricted—both voluntarily and involuntarily—that it
seems to be a vanishing commodity?”119
Proponents of this view observe that taxpayers today disclose sensitive
information contained in their tax returns to a host of third parties, such as
mortgage brokers and college financial-aid officers. In a 2009 article titled The
Future of Tax Privacy, for example, Schwartz commented that, while the tax
return once “constituted the single most detailed source of personal
information,” in current times, “there are multiple sources of information about
all Americans found in databases of public and private organizations,” some of
which are publicly accessible, such as property taxes.120 Further, these scholars
observe that, as a result of information-reporting rules, many taxpayers have
little control over wage and investment information that is reported to the IRS,
so public disclosure of tax return information would not impede the reporting
of that information.121
D. Clouds on the Horizon
As the discussion above demonstrated, proponents of public access contend
that sunlight would improve individual tax compliance by increasing
individual taxpayers’ subjective probabilities of detection and by introducing
117

The Publication of Incomes, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1866, at 4.
E.g., Schwartz, supra note 12, at 896; Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at 148; cf.
George Guttman, The Confidentiality Statute Needs Rethinking, 86 TAX NOTES 318, 319 (2000) (suggesting
that because census data is made public, tax return information should be made public, as well).
119 Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 102.
120 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 896.
121 See, e.g., id. at 898–99.
118

BLANK GALLEYSFINAL3

2011]

4/3/2012 11:56 AM

IN DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL TAX PRIVACY

285

social norms to tax-compliance decisions. Their arguments, however, are
clouded by several significant assumptions.
First, public-access proponents assume that the IRS would have the audit
capability to investigate the tips from citizens and reporters that could result
from a public-access regime,122 even though many of them may not lead to the
discovery of tax noncompliance. This assumption is not realistic. Under
current circumstances, IRS officials report a lack of audit resources to
investigate potential compliance issues that they have identified themselves,
much less those identified by third-party tips that they receive through much
more limited means than full public access.123 For example, in 2006,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson commented that the lack of
resources prevented the IRS from closing nearly 90,000 cases and conducting
over 25,000 correspondence audits.124 Unless the IRS’s operating budget were
to be enlarged significantly, public access to tax return information would not
necessarily lead to increases in actual tax enforcement.
Second, public-access proponents assume that citizens may be willing to
inform the IRS of possible cases of tax noncompliance by people they know
personally. The claim that individuals would report their neighbors and friends
to the IRS upon discovering that they had failed to report cash income or had
claimed deductions for phony dependents, however, may ignore countervailing
social norms among neighbors and friends. Even though public access might
pique an individual’s curiosity regarding her neighbor’s tax return information,
it would not necessarily supersede norms that prevent neighbors from acting
against each other’s interests.125 Just as an individual might not report her
neighbor to the local, municipal authorities for performing construction on her
house without a zoning permit, an individual might not pick up the phone to
contact the IRS when she discovers that her neighbor has engaged in tax
fraud.126
122 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 105 (describing how, in a public access regime, “members of
the public, especially tax experts,” could study returns and report noncompliance).
123 See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., FY2011 IRS BUDGET RECOMMENDATION SPECIAL REPORT 9–11 (2010),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2010/IRSOB%20FY11%20BUDGET%20REPORT.pdf.
124 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Finance, IRS Budget Cut Translates to Huge Tax Loss, (May
22, 2006), http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=199e5e96-5e83-40fe-b567-01f4e9bf3b31.
125 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 123–36 (1991)
(discussing the social-control function of societal norms).
126 Since 2006, new statutory rules have authorized the IRS to pay to whistle-blowers rewards of up to
30% of the proceeds that the IRS collects as a result of information provided. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006).
Although individuals have filed whistle-blower claims with the IRS, it is unclear whether this program will
continue to cause individuals to report information regarding friends, neighbors, and other associates. Cf.
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Third, public-access proponents assume that the fear of social stigma would
encourage taxpayers to report their taxes honestly. For some individual
taxpayers, especially those holding positions of public trust, public access
would likely have this beneficial effect. But, for other individuals, assumptions
regarding the stigmatic nature of aggressive tax avoidance, and even tax
evasion, may be dubious. For example, some sophisticated individuals claim
aggressive tax positions that rely on unsettled interpretations of the tax law127
(indeed, tax lawyers are paid to advise on these murky areas). It is unclear
whether, and which, individual taxpayers would fear public exposure of their
claim of an aggressive, but arguably legal, tax position to claim a tax benefit.
As another example, tax protestors—individuals who do not believe in the
government’s authority to levy taxes—engage in blatant tax fraud and often
boast about it publicly.128 It is unlikely that a public-access regime would cause
these types of extreme offenders to change their behavior in response to the
threat of social stigma.
As this discussion demonstrates, the arguments of public-access proponents
rest on a shaky foundation. However, compared to the arguments of taxpayertrust advocates, which may seem outdated, the public-access arguments appear
to be more compelling to contemporary scholars. Consequently, the trend
among many of these scholars has been to suggest that public access to
individual tax returns should be attempted as a way to increase individual tax
compliance.129

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REFERENCE NO. 2009-30-114,
DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN THE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS 11–12 (2009),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200930114fr.pdf (describing the lengthy
time lapse between submission of whistle-blower claims and payment of rewards); David S. Hilzenrath,
Change in IRS Rules Could Block Rewards for Whistleblowers, WASH. POST, July 1, 2010, at A11 (describing
the elimination of tax-whistle-blower rewards for information that leads to determinations that do not yield
payment). For a discussion of the potential social cost of whistle-blower programs generally, see Alexandra
Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 651 (2004)
(arguing that the informant institution may “erode the relationship between high-crime communities and law
enforcement”).
127 Cf. Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 539, 543–45,
567–71 (2009) (discussing the effect of aggressive tax positions taken by corporations in the absence of settled
law).
128 See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 103–08.
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II. THE STRATEGIC-PUBLICITY FUNCTION OF TAX PRIVACY
Throughout the past 150 years, the contours of the tax privacy debate have
remained remarkably unchanged. Tax privacy advocates speculate that
individuals would fear embarrassment and other consequences if tax returns
were publicly accessible. Public-access proponents, by contrast, hypothesize
that potential tax evaders would fear increased chances of IRS detection and
social stigma; tax privacy advocates refute these claims, and so forth.
One explanation for the recurrent nature of the tax privacy debate is that its
focus thus far has been incomplete. Both sides have fixated on the question of
how taxpayers would comply with the tax system if they knew that other
taxpayers could see their personal tax returns. Neither side, however, has
addressed the converse question: How would taxpayers comply with the tax
system if they could see other taxpayers’ tax returns?
In this Part, I investigate possible answers to that unexplored question. To
consider the relationship of tax privacy and individual tax compliance from
this new perspective, I perform the following thought experiment: I compare
specific tax-enforcement examples that individuals see today under current tax
privacy rules to the specific examples that they could see in a regime in which
all tax return information—including tax returns, liabilities, audit notices, and
settlement agreements with the IRS—were publicly accessible.130 The purpose
of this thought experiment is not to respond to others’ proposals to publicize
tax return information or to advocate for a specific public-access proposal
myself. Rather, by comparing a world with tax privacy to a world without it,
this experiment highlights the effects of tax privacy on individual taxpayers’
perceptions.
My focus on the interaction between tax privacy and specific examples of
tax enforcement is motivated by behavioral research. Public reports of specific
tax-enforcement actions, where taxpayers are named and the contents of their
tax returns are revealed, serve as vivid, specific examples of tax enforcement.
Salient examples of taxpayers paying tax penalties and heading off to prison—
or not—are much more likely to influence individual taxpayers than taxenforcement statistics posted on an IRS website or printed in a Statistics of
Income Division publication. Drawing on the findings of behavioral research, I
argue that these types of salient examples are likely to cause individuals to rely
130 In other words, I invert the privacy protections of return information under current law. For the current
law, see I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2).
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on a variety of cognitive biases to make decisions and judgments that may
depart from rationality, including those regarding whether and how to comply
with the tax system.131
This Part examines the power of tax-enforcement examples on individual
perceptions, considers the specific tax-enforcement examples that individuals
see—and do not see—as a result of tax privacy today, and explores the effects
of the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy on individual tax compliance
under both deterrence and reciprocity models of taxpayer behavior.
A. The Power of Examples
As every good lawyer, teacher, and storyteller knows, an explanation that
includes specific examples involving real people or places can help the
audience visualize an otherwise abstract concept or issue. Vivid examples may
include a description of a person’s identifying traits, such as her name,
occupation, and physical features.132 Statistics, on the other hand, consist of
factual information, such as numbers or percentages, which can be used to
make calculations or measurements. Over many decades of research, cognitive
psychologists have demonstrated that specific examples, involving vivid
descriptions of people or events, may have significant power over individuals’
perceptions and actions.133 But their research should come as no surprise, for
as the old adage reminds us, a picture is worth a thousand words.134
In this Article, I use the term example to refer to a tax-enforcement action
involving a specific taxpayer who is identified by name. When the government
announces that it has indicted a particular taxpayer for engaging in tax fraud
and names the taxpayer in a press release, it provides a specific taxenforcement example. An individual who learns about this tax-enforcement
action can associate it with a specific taxpayer—perhaps a celebrity, politician,
or friend. The following subsections examine the importance of specific
131

See infra Part II.A.1.
See Philip J. Mazzocco & Timothy C. Brock, Understanding the Role of Mental Imagery in
Persuasion: A Cognitive Resources Model Analysis, in CREATING IMAGES AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
MARKETING COMMUNICATION 65, 65–67 (Lynn R. Kahle & Chung-Hyun Kim eds., 2006) (describing the
importance of the “vividness” of a story or description to the salience of images).
133 For an overview of imagery research, see generally STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN ET AL., THE CASE FOR
MENTAL IMAGERY 3–23 (2006); and Stephen M. Kosslyn & William L. Thompson, When Is Early Visual
Cortex Activated During Visual Mental Imagery?, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 723 (2003).
134 See Fred R. Barnard, One Look Is Worth a Thousand Words, PRINTERS’ INK, Dec. 8, 1921, at 96–97
(describing the superiority of an advertisement containing a picture over an advertisement containing only
words).
132
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examples and the interaction between specific examples and individuals’
cognitive biases.
1. Why Examples Matter
Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that specific examples can have
a profound effect on an individual’s creation of mental images, which, in turn,
can help them understand concepts or arguments.135 Examples that include a
description of a person’s identifying traits, such as a name, occupation, and
physical features, may create a vivid image of that person in the mind of an
individual.136 For instance, a television advertisement that includes a vivid
example of a sports celebrity applying a certain brand of shaving cream to his
face may cause viewers to create or recall mental images that could influence
their decisions to purchase that particular product.137 Neuroscientists have
confirmed that an individual’s brain activity is linked to the vividness of an
example of a person or thing that is described to the individual.138
This behavioral research suggests that specific examples of tax
enforcement are likely to influence individuals’ perceptions of certain elements
of the tax system, which, in turn, may affect their decisions to comply with the
tax law. Individuals have articulated beliefs about the audit rate, magnitude of
tax penalties, and rates of compliance that are directly at odds with the publicly
available tax-enforcement statistics.139 The specific examples of various
aspects of tax enforcement, such as tax audits or tax penalties involving
particular taxpayers that individuals encounter, may encourage these beliefs.
Individuals are most likely to encounter a specific example of tax
enforcement when they learn about a tax-enforcement action against a taxpayer
who is identified by name and the subject matter of her tax controversy. For
instance, on April 14, 1988, when Rudolph Giuliani, then a U.S. Attorney,
announced publicly that a federal grand jury had indicted billionaire Leona
135 See, e.g., Nick Ellis, Word Meaning and the Links Between the Verbal System and Modalities of
Perception and Imagery or In Verbal Memory the Eyes See Vividly, but Ears Only Faintly Hear, Fingers
Barely Feel and the Nose Doesn’t Know, in MENTAL IMAGES IN HUMAN COGNITION 313, 314 (Robert H.
Logie & Michel Denis eds., 1991).
136 See Mazzocco & Brock, supra note 132, at 65–67 (describing importance of the “vividness” of a story
or description to the salience of images).
137 See id. at 66–67 (discussing the ways imagery effects a change in attitude in its viewers).
138 See, e.g., K.M. O’Craven & N. Kanwisher, Mental Imagery of Faces and Places Activates
Corresponding Stimulus-Specific Brain Regions, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1013 (2000) (detailing
various experiments mapping cognitive function during mental images).
139 See infra notes 310–12 and accompanying text.
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Helmsley for engaging in tax fraud, he provided a vivid example of tax
enforcement.140 An individual who learned about this tax-enforcement action
by reading reports from print news sources could quickly associate the taxenforcement action with a specific taxpayer and develop a mental image.
Cognitive psychology research suggests that individuals are much less
likely to be influenced by tax-enforcement statistics than by specific taxenforcement examples involving real people.141 Despite the accessibility of
tax-enforcement statistics today, individuals may find it harder to visualize the
tax enforcement described in response to this information, compared to
specific examples, because the information does not identify the taxpayers
involved or describe the content of their tax returns. For example, the 2009 IRS
Data Book states that, in 2008, the IRS audited 343,952 income tax returns for
individuals with income under $200,000 and that, on average, it recommended
an average additional tax of $9,536 following field audits of these returns.142
While these figures inform individuals of the extent of the IRS’s audits of
certain taxpayers and its recommended adjustments, they are less likely to
evoke a memorable mental image in the minds of individual taxpayers than the
Leona Helmsley example described above.
2. Examples and Cognitive Biases
Specific examples involving real people or events may implicate an
individual’s cognitive biases. Cognitive biases are mental shortcuts that lead
individuals to make decisions that are inconsistent with objective rational
behavior.143 By provoking the following cognitive biases, examples may
influence individuals’ perceptions and beliefs.
Salience. Salience generally refers to something that is prominent as
opposed to hidden.144 In their foundational work on biases and heuristics,
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman posited that “salience . . . affect[s] the

140 Ronald Sullivan, The Helmsleys Are Charged with $4 Million in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1988, at A1; see also United States v. Helmsley, 866 F.2d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 1988).
141 Cf. Mazzocco & Brock, supra note 132, at 65–67 (observing that literature has found vivid and
descriptive mental imagery to be more persuasive than verbal statements).
142 IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2009, at 22, 24 (2010),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf.
143 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 3–4.
144 For discussion of the salience bias, see generally Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1145–47 (2009); Schenk, supra note 19, at 254; Sunstein, supra note 19,
at 1301; and Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 11.
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retrievability of instances.”145 Tversky and Kahneman comment that an
individual probably will be more influenced by seeing a house burning to the
ground than by simply reading about the same fire in the local newspaper.146
The salience bias, they explain, causes individuals to focus on the image of the
house fire, which is prominent, as opposed to data about the house fire in the
form of the newspaper article, which is not nearly as visible.147
Availability. Salient examples may cause individuals to rely upon the
availability heuristic, which leads individuals to draw conclusions regarding
the probability that future events will occur by accessing memorable mental
images.148 If an individual hears that a colleague has been the victim of an
armed robbery while walking home from work, for instance, this salient
example may cause the individual to conclude that armed robbery is a common
occurrence near the office.
Anchoring. Salient examples may also provoke the anchoring bias, which
causes individuals to become mentally wedded to certain impressions.149 It is
reasonable to assume that these impressions may be formed by prominent
examples involving specific people or events that individuals encounter. Even
though individuals may eventually encounter new or conflicting data, they may
find it difficult to detach from the initial impression that the example
created.150
Representativeness. The representativeness bias causes individuals to
assume that one thing belongs to another group of things because it contains
certain traits.151 An individual who sees a panhandler on the subway, for
example, may assume that all panhandlers look like that example and,
conversely, that people who look like that example may be panhandlers.
Confirmation. Last, salient examples may implicate the confirmation bias,
which causes individuals to focus on evidence that is partial to their beliefs or

145

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 11.
Id.
147 See id.
148 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem, supra note 19, at 662–64; Latin, supra note 19, at 1233; Sunstein,
supra note 19, at 1297; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207–08 (1973).
149 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem, supra note 19, at 667; Latin, supra note 19, at 1235; Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 19, at 14–18.
150 See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem, supra note 19, at 667.
151 See id. at 664–67; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 4.
146
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expectations.152 For instance, if an individual enjoys smoking cigarettes, she
may think about her elderly uncle who has smoked happily for years. Because
these salient examples are easily accessible, the confirmation bias may cause
individuals to seek them first to confirm a preexisting hypothesis.153
B. Why Not Seeing Is Believing
When the government describes tax-enforcement actions against specific
taxpayers today, it seeks to portray itself as capable of detecting abuse
effectively and applying tax penalties, whether civil or criminal, aggressively.
Because the government has the unilateral power to pursue a public taxenforcement action against a specific taxpayer,154 it plays a unique role in
promoting strong tax enforcement examples.
Statistics released by the IRS and other government agencies, however,
reveal that these examples do not fully represent reality. If we were to lift the
curtain of tax privacy by making tax return information that is currently
confidential—tax returns, records of tax-penalty payments, and audit histories,
among other items—open to public inspection, individuals would see many
salient examples of weak tax enforcement against specific taxpayers that could
detract from the perception of the government as strong and effective.155
This section examines the way in which tax privacy filters the specific
examples of tax enforcement that individuals see—and do not see—and
examines their potential behavioral effects on individuals due to their
perceptions of the government’s tax-enforcement capabilities.
1. Tax-Enforcement Examples We See
By carefully publicizing salient examples of tax-enforcement actions
against specific taxpayers, the government actively attempts to influence
individual taxpayers’ perceptions of its ability to detect abusive tax activities,
152 See Asher Koriat, When Confidence in a Choice Is Independent of Which Choice Is Made, 15
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 997, 1000 (2008); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
153 See Nickerson, supra note 152, at 175–76.
154 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.70 (2011) (granting to the Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division authority
to prosecute virtually all civil and criminal proceedings under the internal revenue laws).
155 Cf. IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2010 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 14 (2011), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2011/IRSOB%202010%20Taxpayer%20Attitude%20Survey.pdf (reporting that
46% of surveyed taxpayers believed the IRS maintained an effective balance between enforcement activities
and customer service).
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levy strong tax penalties against offenders, and achieve legal victories. The
following discussion describes the specific examples of strong tax-enforcement
actions that individuals see today.
a. Detected Abuse
The government deliberately attempts to raise public awareness of its
ability to detect abusive tax activities by showcasing memorable instances of
its detection successes. Salient examples of the government’s detection of the
abusive tax activities of specific taxpayers may cause individuals to increase
their subjective probabilities that the government will detect them if they
engage in aggressive or abusive tax planning.
The government pursues public tax-enforcement efforts against specific
taxpayers in part to influence the perceptions of the general public. A former
head of the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division acknowledged that the IRS
seeks to “generate multiple press stories nationwide about particular cases”156
to “deter . . . potential cheaters.”157 To aid its publicity efforts, the Criminal
Investigation Division assigns dozens of “public information officers” in each
of its field offices to serve as “the local . . . media contact[s] to provide public
record information to the media about the field office[s’] cases.”158 Further,
government officials have revealed that they carefully monitor the “publicity
rate,” a measure of the extent to which publicly announced civil and criminal
tax cases receive press coverage.159
The media often work in tandem with the government by publicizing the
government’s tax-enforcement actions against specific taxpayers, particularly
when these actions involve criminal sanctions, celebrities, or both. Reporters
often print descriptions of tax-enforcement actions that they excerpt directly
from government press releases and announcements.160 The media’s tendency

156

Mark E. Matthews, New IRS Publicity Strategy, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., July 2001, at 15.
Id. at 16; accord Kristen A. Parillo, Korb: Tax Press Plays Key Role in IRS Communications Strategy,
118 TAX NOTES 478, 478–79 (2008) (describing and quoting similar statements by former IRS Chief Counsel
Donald Korb).
158 Jeremiah Coder, Conversations: Eileen Mayer, 116 TAX NOTES 738, 740 (2007).
159 See, e.g., id.
160 See, e.g., Amy Bonawitz, “Girls Gone Wild” Founder Indicted, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009, 5:03
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/11/entertainment/main2673413.shtml (citing Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Creator of Girls Gone Wild Indicted for Tax Evasion (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://
www.justice.gov/tax/txdv07237.htm).
157
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to publicize specific tax-enforcement examples peaks reliably during the weeks
leading up to Tax Day each year.161
The government often provides the public with concrete examples of its
successful detection efforts regarding abusive tax activities that are pervasive
or that have the potential to spread. Several examples of these types of public
tax-enforcement announcements are described below.
Tax Fraud. Every year, the government announces specific cases in which
it has detected taxpayers who have engaged in tax fraud. In addition to issuing
its annual “dirty dozen” list of tax scams that bear these traits,162 the
government provides specific examples of taxpayers who have attempted to
engage in these strategies and have failed to escape detection, including
celebrities and other prominent taxpayers. Recent public examples of the
government’s successful detection of tax fraud by specific high-profile
individuals include Joe Francis, the creator of the Girls Gone Wild videos, who
attempted to deduct $20 million in phony business expenses;163 Richard Hatch,
the former star of the reality television show Survivor, who attempted to omit
his $1 million prize and other items from taxable income;164 and actor Nicolas
Cage, who improperly deducted over $3 million for meals, gifts, and expenses
associated with his Gulfstream jet as business expenses.165
Sophisticated Tax Evasion. Often the government’s publicly announced
tax-enforcement efforts involve more sophisticated forms of tax evasion by
prominent business figures and other wealthy individuals. For example, in
April 2010, following its settlement with UBS, the Swiss global financial
services company, regarding its promotion of offshore banking activities, the
U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division announced separate criminal pleas
and civil settlements involving specific former clients of UBS on each of the
three days leading up to and including Tax Day, when seven individuals were
charged on that single day with hiding over $100 million in foreign bank

161

See Blank & Levin, supra note 16, at 18.
See, e.g., Beware of IRS’ 2009 “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams, IRS (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=206370,00.html.
163 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 160.
164 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Survivor” Winner Richard Hatch Is Sentenced to 51 Months in
Prison for Tax Evasion (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/usaopress/2006/txdv06_RH_
TaxEvasion.pdf.
165 Janet Novack & William P. Barrett, Nic Cage’s Other Weekend Premiere: IRS Settlement,
FORBES.COM (Sept. 5, 2008, 3:11 PM), available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/05/hollywood-taxes-cagebiz-media-cz_wb_jn_0905cage.html.
162

BLANK GALLEYSFINAL3

2011]

4/3/2012 11:56 AM

IN DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL TAX PRIVACY

295

accounts.166 The government also uses specific examples to publicize its
detection of prominent or wealthy individuals who have failed to file required
disclosure forms regarding suspicious tax activities with the government.167
Cash Economy. The government regularly issues public announcements
regarding its successful detection of “cash economy” taxpayers, or those
taxpayers who have engaged in transactions that are not subject to third-party
information reporting or withholding.168 A typical example is the government’s
2009 announcement of the conviction of Bruce Lapierre, Albert Martin, and
Lorraine Martin, owners of a Rhode Island machine shop, who intentionally
used cash and money orders for amounts less than $10,000 to avoid U.S.
Currency Transaction Reports.169 Other salient examples include instances in
which the government has prosecuted or enjoined sole proprietors who have
operated businesses out of their homes and have attempted to deduct personal
expenses as business expenses.170
Tax Protestors. Other frequent subjects of the government’s publicity
efforts are tax protestors, or individuals who refuse to pay federal income taxes
on unsupported constitutional or other legal grounds. For instance, in 2004, the
government issued several public announcements regarding its successful
indictment of Irwin Schiff, who had advised nearly 5000 clients to file tax
returns filled in with zeros on all lines.171 Other examples include the
government’s public announcement of the detection of individuals, such as
166 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former UBS Client Pleads Guilty to Hiding Assets in Secret
Offshore Bank Accounts (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-tax-401.
html; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Seven UBS Clients Charged with Hiding over $100 Million in Secret
Swiss Bank Accounts to Defraud the IRS (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv10_
USB_Clients.htm; Press Release, Stacey A. Levine & Michael C. Vasiliadis, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former
UBS Client Pleads Guilty to Failing to Report over $1 Million in Swiss Bank Accounts (Apr. 12, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2010/Abrahamsen,%20Harry%20Plea%20PR.
pdf.
167 For instance, in 2011, the government announced that it had discovered that Arthur Joel Eisenberg, a
resident of Seattle, had failed to file with the IRS a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts form
(FBAR) regarding his large Cayman Islands bank account. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former UBS Client
Sentenced for Hiding Millions in Offshore Bank Accounts (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2011/March/11-tax-279.html.
168 For a discussion of these kinds of taxpayers, see Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax
Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 39–40 (2009).
169 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Rhode Island Machine Shop Owners Convicted of Tax Fraud (Mar. 30,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv09283.html.
170 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Sues to Stop Home-Based Business Tax
Scam (Apr. 10, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv03225.htm.
171 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Irwin Schiff and Two Associates Indicted for Tax Fraud (Mar. 24,
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv04182.htm.
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Daniel Edward Turner, who, in 2004, attempted to submit over $491,000 to the
Treasury in “Bills of Exchange,” some of which appeared similar to regular
checks but referenced nonexistent accounts.172
Timing. Not only does the government publicize specific examples of its
detection successes, but it also announces them disproportionately during the
weeks leading up to Tax Day compared to the rest of the year. In an empirical
study on this issue, Daniel Levin and I examined all press releases issued by
the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division during the seven-year period from
2003 through 2009 in which the agency announced a civil or criminal taxenforcement action against a specific taxpayer by name.173 We found that in
the two weeks leading up to Tax Day, the government issued more than double
the number of tax-enforcement press releases per week than it did during the
rest of the year.174
The chart below shows a graphic illustration of our findings of the average
frequency of tax-enforcement press releases issued throughout the year from
2003 through 2009:

172 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Tax Protestor Convicted in Gainesville (Mar. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/tax/usaopress/2009/txdv09_Convict_Tax_Protest.pdf.
173 See Blank & Levin, supra note 16, at 4.
174 See id. at 17. For the time window from April 1 to Tax Day, we found that the government issued
128% more tax-enforcement press releases per week than during the rest of the year. Id.
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FREQUENCY OF TAX-ENFORCEMENT PRESS RELEASES (2003–2009)175
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The disproportionately large number of tax-enforcement press releases
issued during the two weeks prior to Tax Day compared to the rest of the year
was highly statistically significant.176 In other words, this analysis strongly
supported the hypothesis that the difference did not occur by chance. As we
stated in our study, the timing of the government’s public announcements of
tax-enforcement actions against specific taxpayers coincides with the weeks
leading up to Tax Day, the time of year when the vast majority of individual
taxpayers are in the process of preparing their own individual tax returns.177
Behavioral Effects. By publicizing salient examples of specific taxpayers
engaged in abusive tax activities whom the government has detected
successfully, especially during the weeks leading up to Tax Day, the
government may take advantage of the availability heuristic of individual

175

Id. at 18.
“The negative binomial regression model’s likelihood ratio chi-square [was] 23.48 . . . .” Id. at 16. The
p-value was only .0000013. Id. These statistics mean, essentially, that there is a one-in-791,637 chance that
this difference in the issuance of tax-enforcement press releases was random. Id.
177 Cf. id. at 13 (“[T]he vast majority of annual individual income tax returns are filed with the [IRS]
between February 1 and Tax Day each year. In 2008, for example, nearly 80% of all annual individual income
tax returns were filed during this period.” (footnote omitted)).
176

BLANK GALLEYSFINAL3

298

4/3/2012 11:56 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:265

taxpayers.178 After encountering salient examples of specific taxpayers whom
the government has detected, individual taxpayers who might otherwise be
inclined to claim a questionable tax position may overestimate the IRS’s
capacity to detect abuse. Compared to faceless tax-enforcement statistics,
concrete examples of specific taxpayers whom the government has caught,
whether celebrities, local business figures, or officials, are memorable and thus
available.
b. Strong Tax Penalties
While the Internal Revenue Code contains a myriad of tax penalties that
apply in varying degrees of severity, the government’s public announcements
and media reports regarding specific taxpayers who have received tax penalties
almost exclusively involve criminal sanctions or high civil tax penalties. These
salient examples may lead individuals to overvalue the tax penalties that may
apply to many tax offenses.
Strong Criminal Tax Penalties. In the examples of detected abuse described
above, not only did the government publicly announce its success in catching
noncompliant taxpayers, but in many cases, it also announced that these
taxpayers would face criminal sanctions. When the government announces a
public tax-enforcement action against a celebrity taxpayer who has engaged in
a flagrant omission of taxable income, it frequently reveals that the taxpayer
could face prison time.179 Similar results occur in public tax-enforcement
actions against individuals who have used more sophisticated tax-evasion
methods, such as many former UBS clients who used offshore bank accounts
to hide income and received prison or probation sentences as a consequence.180
Further, when the government announces that it has detected habitual casheconomy tax evaders, it often states its intention to pursue criminal
sanctions.181 Consistent with the timing patterns described above, the
government’s announcements of criminal tax sanctions against specific
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For a description of the availability heuristic, see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Wesley Snipes Surrenders on Tax Charges (Dec. 8, 2006),
available at media.tbo.com/graphics/120806snipes.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 164.
180 For the government’s announcement of UBS clients who have received criminal sentences, see
Offshore Tax-Avoidance and IRS Compliance Efforts, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110092,
00.html (last updated Dec. 13, 2011).
181 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 169 (describing potential fifteen-year prison
sentences for cash-economy taxpayers).
179

BLANK GALLEYSFINAL3

2011]

4/3/2012 11:56 AM

IN DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL TAX PRIVACY

299

taxpayers occur disproportionately in the weeks leading up to Tax Day
compared to the rest of the year.182
Popular culture mirrors the specific examples of tax penalties that the
government’s public tax-enforcement actions create. Lawrence Zelenak
reviewed eighty-nine radio and television situation comedy episodes from the
1940s to the early 2000s in which the federal income tax played a major
role.183 In about half the episodes that he studied, the possibility of criminal tax
penalties for tax fraud was discussed.184 Vivid examples of memorable
characters, such as Archie Bunker185 or Homer Simpson,186 facing prison time
for tax evasion may further solidify individuals’ perception that the penalties
for tax noncompliance are significant.
Strong Civil Tax Penalties. In addition, when the government announces a
plea agreement with a specific taxpayer who has agreed to receive criminal
sanctions rather than face trial, it often declares the size of the civil tax penalty
that the taxpayer has paid. For example, in 2011, when the government
announced the guilty plea of Arthur Joel Eisenberg for failing to file a Report
of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) for his offshore UBS bank
account, it also announced that Eisenberg paid a $2.1 million civil tax penalty
to the IRS.187 The government has announced similar plea agreements
involving dozens of wealthy individuals who have pled guilty for failing to
report offshore bank accounts and who have paid hefty civil penalties, ranging
from $1 million188 to $20.8 million.189
Further, the public may learn about the civil tax penalties owed by
particular taxpayers as a result of the federal government’s filing of tax liens
against taxpayers who have failed to submit payments to the IRS. Even though
the Notice of Federal Tax Lien does not explicitly state the amount of a
taxpayer’s civil tax penalty itself, tax liens are attributable to tax, interest, and

182

Blank & Levin, supra note 16, at 18.
Lawrence Zelenak, Six Decades of the Federal Income Tax in Sitcoms, 117 TAX NOTES 1265 (2007).
184 Id. at 1266–67.
185 All in the Family: Archie’s Fraud (CBS television broadcast Sept. 23, 1972).
186 The Simpsons: The Trouble with Trillions (20th Century Fox television broadcast Apr. 5, 1998).
187 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 167.
188 See Offshore Tax-Avoidance and IRS Compliance Efforts, supra note 180.
189 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former UBS Client Pays $20.8 Million Penalty for Hiding over $41
Million in Swiss Bank Accounts (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
September10/robbinsjulessentencingpr.pdf.
183
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tax penalties owed.190 When celebrity taxpayers are subject to the tax liens, the
media typically feature multiple stories about the size of their taxes and tax
penalties.191 In some cases, the media may focus on the size of the tax lien,
rather than the notoriety of the taxpayer. For example, in 2010, the IRS filed a
$172 million tax lien against Marcos Esparza Bofill, who lived in New York
for only a year while working as a day trader.192 The media’s investigation of
this lien revealed that a large portion of this bill was due to large unreported
gross gains (because Bofill failed to file tax returns, the IRS did not receive
information regarding his losses).193 It is possible that the high dollar amounts
involved in many of these liens may lead taxpayers to believe, often
accurately, that the taxpayer involved is liable for significant tax penalties.
Behavioral Effects. Salient examples of specific taxpayers’ tax penalties,
such as those described above, may encourage individuals to develop an
exaggerated perception of tax penalties and the government’s willingness to
impose them on taxpayers. Individuals often become mentally wedded or
anchored to certain images or values.194 When the anchoring bias takes hold,
individuals may find it difficult to detach themselves from their initial
impression, even though they may encounter new or conflicting data.195
Government officials appear to exploit this bias further by issuing taxpayer
guidance that warns individuals that, if they “willfully fail to meet their tax
obligations,” they may face tax penalties, including “criminal prosecution.”196
While only a tiny percentage of taxpayers face criminal prosecution for tax
evasion each year197 and many taxpayers do not face civil tax penalties at
190

See I.R.C. § 6321 (2006); IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CAT. NO. 60025X, FORM 668(Y)(c): NOTICE
FEDERAL TAX LIEN (2004); Topic 201—The Collection Process, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc201.
html (last updated Dec. 22, 2011).
191 See, e.g., Lois Weiss & Dan Mangan, It’s Lien Streets for ‘Tardy’ Marty: Scorsese Slapped with
$2.85M Back-Tax Bill, N.Y. POST, Mar. 8, 2011, at 5 (describing a tax lien as resulting from “taxes and related
interest and penalties” (emphasis added)).
192 See Bill Hutchinson, Thought You Had IRS Problems? Failed Day-Trader Nailed with $172M Bill,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 24, 2010, at 8.
193 See id.
194 Supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
195 Id.
196 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, North Carolina Attorneys Plead Guilty to Failing to File Tax Returns
(Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv05168.htm (quoting then-Assistant Attorney
General Eileen J. O’Connor).
197 In 2009, the federal government authorized the prosecution of 1210 criminal tax cases. TAX DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 25 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/
2011justification/pdf/fy11-tax-justification.pdf. This number represents .00086% of the total individual tax
returns filed in 2009. See Individual Complete Report (Publication 1304), Table 1.6, SOI Tax Stats—
Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/
OF
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all,198 the examples of specific, recognizable taxpayers facing such penalties
may cause some individuals to become anchored to the impression that most
penalties for tax noncompliance are high.
c. Tax-Controversy Victories
Last, the government may publicize its successes in both criminal and civil
tax litigation to foster the perception that taxpayers have a low chance of
prevailing in a tax controversy against it. Government officials have stated
publicly that they believe that government victories in criminal and civil tax
controversies “receive wide media coverage” and, as a result, have “a
significant multiplier effect on voluntary compliance.”199 Consistent with these
words, the government reinforces the perception that it prevails in most tax
controversies by publicizing vivid descriptions of its victories against specific
taxpayers in criminal and civil tax litigation in the public courts.
Criminal Tax Victories. The most memorable public tax disputes often
involve criminal tax cases against specific taxpayers. The Tax Division
litigates these cases, and its lawyers win almost all of them. In 2009, for
example, the government won 98% of all criminal tax controversies that it
prosecuted.200 Just two years earlier, this success rate was 100%.201
Consequently, when individuals hear about a criminal tax-enforcement action
against a specific taxpayer through news reports or other sources, they almost
always learn that the taxpayer involved has entered a guilty plea or received a
criminal sanction, such as a prison sentence. Even when the government loses
on the merits on the heftiest criminal charges against a particular taxpayer, it
often succeeds in obtaining a conviction on lesser charges or enters into a plea
agreement with the taxpayer.202
Civil Tax Victories. Although the government’s success rate in civil tax
controversies is not as high as its near-perfect record in criminal tax
controversies, its record of success in civil tax litigation is strong. The IRS
article/0,,id=96981,00.html (follow “2009” hyperlink) (last updated Nov. 23, 2011) (reporting that
140,494,127 individual tax returns were filed in 2009).
198 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REFERENCE NO. 2010-30059, ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTIES ARE SELDOM CONSIDERED PROPERLY DURING CORRESPONDENCE
AUDITS 5 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2010reports/201030059fr.pdf.
199 TAX DIV., supra note 197, at 2.
200 Id. at 23.
201 See id.
202 See, e.g., Wesley Snipes Gets 3 Years for Not Filing Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008, at C3
(noting that the defendant was acquitted of tax fraud but convicted of willful failure to file a federal tax return).
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Office of Chief Counsel wins the majority of civil tax disputes in U.S. Tax
Court involving the most litigated issues.203 For example, according to the
Taxpayer Advocate Service, in 2009, the IRS won civil tax controversies in
U.S. Tax Court involving the following issues: gross income (95% government
success rate), accuracy-related penalties (84%), collection due process (92%),
summons enforcement (96%), trade or business expenses (65%), and frivolous
issue penalties (94%).204 These results should not be surprising because the
IRS Appeals Division openly considers the “hazards of litigation” when
determining whether to litigate or settle tax controversies.205 If a tax
controversy reaches a public court, the government believes it has a high
probability of success.
Behavioral Effects. Salient examples of government victories in tax
disputes involving specific taxpayers implicate at least two cognitive biases
that may cause an individual to overestimate the odds that the government will
succeed on the merits in litigation. Because so many of the highly publicized
tax disputes involve celebrities and other prominent individuals, the
availability heuristic206 may cause the individual to conclude that government
victories in tax litigation are the norm. And if her tax position leads to
litigation, the anchoring bias207 may cause her to concede issues to the
government. The reason for this reaction is that she may be anchored to the
perception that, if the tax controversy were to reach court, the government
would prevail on at least some of the disputed issues.
2. Tax-Enforcement Examples We Do Not See
The examples of tax enforcement that are visible today portray the
government as enforcing the tax law effectively and efficiently. It catches tax
cheats, wins in court, and ensures that strong punishments for tax
noncompliance are levied. Yet these examples of successful tax enforcement
feature only a tiny sampling of taxpayers. We cannot see the details of other
taxpayers’ tax returns or their disputes with the government. They are not
visible because tax privacy hides them from public view.
203 See 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2009
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 406 tbl.3.0.2 (2009).
204 See id. (listing the total number of cases litigated involving each issue and comparing the number of
successes of pro se litigants with those of represented litigants).
205 See David M. Fogel, The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals Division, 99 TAX NOTES 1503, 1503–
04 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
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What would we see in a world without individual tax privacy? To explore
the possibilities, let us imagine a regime of public access in which the tax
return information of individuals that is protected by tax privacy could be
viewed by the media and the general public. In this hypothetical public-access
regime, a taxpayer’s tax return and related information could be made publicly
available in a searchable online database, so that the reporters and ordinary
citizens could examine any taxpayer’s tax returns, audit history, settlement
agreements, and other tax return information.
As the discussion below reveals, by lifting the curtain of tax privacy, we
would see very different examples of tax enforcement involving specific
taxpayers compared to those we see today. In contrast to the examples we see
today, a public-access regime could enable us to see concrete examples of the
government failing to detect abusive tax activities, declining to apply tax
penalties (whether criminal or civil), and offering taxpayers concessions in its
substantive legal challenges.
Privacy rules in the tax context serve a unique function in enhancing public
confidence in the government. Imagine, for example, that a local police
department attempted to win public support by announcing only the murder
cases that it had solved and by not revealing any information about murder
cases that remained unsolved. Would the public believe that the police had
successfully solved all murder cases? Most likely, the answer is no. In quests
for justice, at least some family members of the victims of the unsolved
murders would speak out publicly about the failure of the police to catch the
murderers. By contrast, the only direct “victim” of tax noncompliance is the
government itself (society, of course, is the indirect victim). Consequently, in
the tax context, the government possesses the unique ability to refrain from
revealing instances of undetected tax noncompliance to the public, while only
emphasizing instances in which its agents have successfully enforced the tax
law.
a. Undetected Abuse
Without the curtain of tax privacy, the media—and ultimately ordinary
citizens—could observe concrete examples of taxpayers who may have
engaged in abusive tax activities, yet escaped detection by the IRS. The
media’s focus on instances in which the IRS appeared to fail to detect abuse
could lead individuals to reduce their own subjective probabilities of being
detected by the IRS.

BLANK GALLEYSFINAL3

304

4/3/2012 11:56 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:265

Despite the government’s dramatic public announcements of its successful
detection of tax noncompliance, ranging from blatant tax fraud208 to
sophisticated tax shelter activity,209 publicly available tax-enforcement
statistics strongly suggest that many taxpayers engage in abusive tax avoidance
or tax evasion without prompting an IRS audit or other investigation. For
example, as a result of the IRS’s limited budgetary resources, the audit rate for
individual taxpayers perennially hovers around 1% (in 2009, for example, it
was 1.03%).210 Other public reports indicate that hundreds of thousands of
citizens simply fail to file tax returns at all, and the IRS lacks the resources to
investigate these cases.211 Publicly available statistics also reveal that the IRS
has reduced its audit coverage of wealthy taxpayers over the last decade (for
example, by 36% from 2007 to 2008),212 yet studies show that taxpayers with
adjusted gross incomes of $500,000 to $1,000,000 fail to accurately report
21% of their income on average.213 Consistent with this data, IRS officials
have conceded that they do not audit many instances of abuse.214
Instead of anonymous statistics, the elimination of tax privacy would reveal
the identities of taxpayers who have engaged in abusive tax planning and
whom the IRS has failed to pursue. Especially in the case of celebrities and
government officials, public access to tax return information could generate a
media frenzy over tax returns that appear to show low taxable income
compared to these individuals’ apparent wealth or other suspicious items that
may imply the use of abusive tax-planning techniques. Likewise, for curious
citizens, public access to tax return information could offer examples of friends
and neighbors who may have claimed improper tax positions on their tax
returns.
If individuals were to encounter examples of specific taxpayers who had
engaged in abusive tax activities, they may conclude that the IRS has failed to
detect these instances unless the publicly available tax return information
208

See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
210 Fiscal Year 2009 Enforcement Results, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/fy_2009_enforcement_
results.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
211 See generally DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL 204–05 (2003).
212 See IRS Audit Rate for Millionaires Plummets, TRAC IRS (Mar. 23, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/
latest/204/.
213 See, e.g., Andrew Johns & Joel Slemrod, The Distribution of Income Tax Noncompliance, 63 NAT’L
TAX J. 397, 404, 413 (2010).
214 JOHNSTON, supra note 211, at 200 (quoting Frank Keith, former senior IRS spokesman, as stating that,
“with limited resources[,] the I.R.S. must often choose which cases to pursue” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
209
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shows otherwise. Upon discovering a specific taxpayer’s apparent abuse, the
media, or even ordinary individuals, could review the taxpayer’s publicly
available tax return information to determine whether the IRS had sent the
taxpayer an audit letter (a “Summary of Proposed Changes”)215 or a statutory
notice of deficiency,216 whether the taxpayer had filed a protest with the IRS
Appeals Division in response to a revenue-agent letter,217 or whether the
taxpayer had filed any amended tax returns that revised the original abusive tax
position. If none of these items were present, then the media’s discovery of a
case of abuse involving a specific taxpayer could lead to the perception that the
IRS had failed to detect this abuse on its own.
What types of undetected abuse would a public-access regime expose?
Several categories are discussed below.
Rich and Famous. Public access to tax return information would provide
the media with a treasure trove of information about the tax affairs of
prominent individuals, politicians, and celebrities. While tax returns are
currently not available to the media, reporters have seized on any opportunity
in recent years to reveal the tax irregularities of high-profile individuals,
especially when the public may view these irregularities as indicative of
hypocrisy or worse.
A hint of the media’s likely reaction to public access can be found by
reviewing its coverage of political candidates and nominees for executive
appointments over the past decade. For example, while running for Governor
of Georgia in 2010, Roy Barnes released his personal tax returns, which
reflected large depreciation deductions for certain years.218 After reviewing the
returns and comparing them to property records, investigative journalists
discovered that Barnes had improperly claimed these depreciation deductions
for property that he did not own.219 Other examples have occurred in many
presidential-appointment nomination cycles.220 When President Obama
215 CP 2000 Sample Contents Page 1, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=169287,00.
html (last updated Sept. 9, 2011).
216 I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2006).
217 See Letters and Notices Offering an Appeal, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=
160744,00.html (last updated July 25, 2011) (describing IRS Letter 525—General 30 Day Letter).
218 Larry Peterson, Barnes Takes Tax Break on House that Isn’t His, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, Oct.
14, 2010, at A6.
219 E.g., id.
220 See, e.g., Matt Kelley, Tax Snafus Add Up for Obama Team, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2009, at A1
(describing the unpaid tax liability of Hilda Solis, Obama’s nominee for Secretary of Labor); Claudia Wallis,
The Lessons of Nannygate, TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 76 (describing the tax troubles of President Clinton’s
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presented Congress with his slate of nominees for executive appointments in
2009, the media reported hundreds of stories on the tax problems of nominees,
such as former U.S. Senator Tom Daschle, nominee for Health and Human
Services Secretary, who failed to report the value of free car service from his
employer as taxable income;221 and Timothy Geithner, nominee for Treasury
Secretary, who failed to pay self-employment taxes for several years on
income received while working for the International Monetary Fund.222
While these examples reveal the tax noncompliance of prominent
individuals, they also expose the IRS’s failure to detect the improper items
through audits or other means. Without the public release of their tax returns
and the accompanying media and political interest that followed, these
individuals likely would not have voluntarily alerted the IRS to these errors or
filed amended tax returns to correct them. Public access would only enhance
the media’s ability to showcase high-profile, recognizable individuals who had
engaged in tax avoidance or evasion. In the cases where the featured celebrity
did not undergo a formal IRS audit or investigation, the public would see
memorable examples of the government’s failure to detect abuse.
Perceived Abuse. Public access could also encourage the media to report
instances in which taxpayers claim tax positions that appear to be abusive,
even though they are consistent with Congress’s intent. For instance, in 2010,
after causing millions of gallons of oil to spill into the Gulf of Mexico, British
Petroleum created a $20 billion fund to compensate individuals and businesses
that suffered harm as a result of the spill, and also incurred other clean-up
costs.223 When British Petroleum revealed that it would claim these amounts as
a tax deduction and use the deduction to offset taxable income from a prior
year, the mainstream media and the general public appeared to perceive that

nominees for Attorney General, Kimba Wood and Zoe Baird); Michael J. Sniffen, Nominees Sunk by Tax and
Nanny Problems for Years, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 14, 2009, 12:47 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
politics/2008628347_apnanniesandtaxes.html (describing tax noncompliance by presidential nominees from
1993 through 2004); Tax Issues Prompt Obama Nominee to Withdraw, CNN POL. (Feb. 3, 2009), http://
articles.cnn.com/2009-02-03/politics/performance.nominee.withdraws_1_nancy-killefer-chief-performanceofficer-unemployment-tax?_s=PM:POLITICS (describing the withdrawal of Nancy Killefer, nominated by
President Obama to serve as Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget).
221 Jeff Zeleny, Daschle Ends Bid for Post, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A1.
222 Jackie Calmes, Treasury Nomination Hits Snag over Issue of Past Unpaid Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2009, at A1.
223 Barack Obama, President, Remarks Following a Meeting with BP Leadership (June 16, 2010),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000503/html/DCPD-201000503.htm.
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the corporation had engaged in an abusive tax shelter.224 Even the White House
Press Secretary acknowledged American taxpayers’ outrage that they would
foot the bill for British Petroleum’s disaster.225 The tax position of British
Petroleum, however, was clearly intended by Congress and consistent with a
normative income tax base (that is, a business should be able to deduct
ordinary and necessary business expenses from its taxable income).226 A
public-access regime could cause the media to focus on similar types of
perceived “abuse” by individual taxpayers, such as when they realize income
that they do not recognize for tax purposes227 or when they bequeath valuable
property to others without recognizing taxable gain.228
Cash Economy. Another category of specific examples of the government’s
failure to detect abuse that could emerge as a result of public access are stories
regarding businesses that conduct most of their operations by engaging in
transactions that are not subject to information-reporting or withholding
rules.229 Although the government publicizes its success in cracking down on
cash-economy businesses that fail to report the proper amount of taxable
income, in reality, the compliance rate among small businesses and sole
proprietorships generally is about 50%.230
Public access to tax return information could enable the media, on both a
national and local level, to produce salient news stories about the low reported
taxable income of certain cash-economy businesses. For example, as a result of
its own investigative reporting, in 2000, the New York Times published a story

224 See, e.g., Jia Lynn Yang, BP to Cut Its U.S. Tax Bill by $10 Billion, WASH. POST, July 28, 2010, at A4
(quoting Rep. Eliot L. Engel of New York, who declared, “I call on BP to show, for once, a glimmer of
humanity in this situation and halt its claim for this tax break immediately” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
225 Id.
226 See I.R.C. §§ 165, 172 (2006) (describing net operating loss deductions).
227 See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Buffet-Ducking Billionaires Avoid Reporting Cash Gains to IRS, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 21, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-21/billionaires-duck-buffett-17-taxtarget-avoiding-reporting-cash-to-irs.html (describing taxpayers who hold appreciated stock and utilize
“strategies that reap hundreds of millions of dollars from those valuable shares in ways the IRS often doesn’t
classify as taxable income”).
228 See, e.g., Josh Kosman, Steve Jobs’ Heirs to Avoid Big Tax Hit if They Sell Apple Stake Right Away,
N.Y. POST (Oct. 6, 2011, 11:48 PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/techie_avoided_tax_man_
jKZ3b9dhOGZSZqtnXhcqUI (noting Jobs’s use of I.R.C. § 1014).
229 See Susan Cleary Morse et al., supra note 168, at 41.
230 See IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP 13 fig.4, 14 fig.5 (2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf (reporting that nonfarm-proprietor income is underreported at a rate of 57%).
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titled Defying the I.R.S., Anti-Tax Businesses Refuse to Withhold,231 which
featured small-business owners who openly boasted on the Internet and in
other venues that they had stopped paying income taxes and stopped
withholding or paying over Social Security or Medicare taxes. A later story
reported that one small business, Kristi Tool Company of Magnolia,
Massachusetts, had not withheld taxes since 1979 and had never faced an audit
or inquiry from the IRS.232 After investigating the blatant tax evasion of
twenty-three small businesses, a 2000 article commented that “there is no
public record showing litigation or enforcement actions like liens against the
companies’ assets.”233 The lack of IRS action in this case became the primary
focus of the story, as it concluded that “[t]he failure of the IRS to act even
against those who openly defy the tax laws raises questions about the agency’s
ability to stop tax cheating.”234 A public-access regime could provide the
media with even more information about the underreporting of income by cash
businesses that have failed to comply with the tax law but have avoided IRS
detection.
Tax Protestors. The tax returns of tax protestors, especially where the
government has not pursued an audit or other legal action, would likely cause
reporters to produce vivid examples of taxpayers who seemingly claimed farfetched tax positions on their tax returns without suffering consequences. For
example, in 2003, David Cay Johnston, then a reporter for the New York Times,
discovered through investigative journalism that the actor Wesley Snipes was
an adherent to the “861 position,” a frequent legal argument of tax
protestors.235 Johnston’s reporting revealed that Snipes had filed refund claims
for millions in paid taxes and that he had even altered the jurat—the text at the
bottom of the tax return that requires taxpayers to declare that the tax return is
correct “under penalties of perjury”—by inserting the word “no” between the
words “under” and “penalties.”236 Because Johnston had uncovered this
information three years before Snipes was indicted on tax-fraud charges in
2006, it may have appeared to some observers at the time as though Snipes had

231 David Cay Johnston, Defying the I.R.S., Anti-Tax Businesses Refuse to Withhold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2000, § 1, at 1.
232 David Cay Johnston, IRS Going After Businesses on Withholding Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at
C1.
233 Johnston, supra note 231, § 1, at 45.
234 Id.
235 JOHNSTON, supra note 211, at 195–96. The IRS has defined this argument as “frivolous” in Rev. Rul.
2004-30, 2004-1 C.B. 622.
236 JOHNSTON, supra note 211, at 195–96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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successfully relied upon a tax-protestor argument without being detected by
the IRS. Government officials admit that review of tax protestors’ tax returns
“places a severe administrative burden on the I.R.S.” by consuming thousands
of work hours from IRS agents237—in many cases, likely without producing
counterbalancing tax revenue.
Friends, Neighbors, and Personal Associates. While a public-access
regime would likely cause the media, with its investigative resources, to serve
as the primary source of specific examples of the government’s lack of
detection of abusive tax activities, public access would also empower
individuals to research the tax activities of their friends, neighbors, and
personal associates. The annual individual income tax return, IRS Form
1040,238 contains a wealth of information that could enable some individuals to
determine whether their personal associates had claimed improper tax
positions, such as whether a taxpayer filed a tax return at all; how much a
taxpayer reported as adjusted gross income;239 whether the taxpayer paid selfemployment tax;240 whether the taxpayer paid taxes resulting from a household
employee;241 how many dependents the taxpayer claimed;242 whether the
taxpayer reported alimony;243 and whether the taxpayer claimed special tax
credits, such as the Earned Income Credit244 or the First-Time Homebuyer
Credit.245
Consequently, if tax returns were publicly accessible, an individual could
determine whether her neighbor, who runs a cash business out of his basement,
had paid self-employment tax or even reported taxable income.246 An
individual could determine whether her friend who clearly employs a live-in
housekeeper had paid household employment taxes.247 Or an individual who

237 Id. at 200 (quoting the affidavit of Rae Ann Thurell, an IRS manager) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
238 IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OMB NO. 1545-0074, FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURN (2011).
239 Id. at l. 37.
240 IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OMB NO. 1545-0074, SCHEDULE SE (FORM 1040): SELF-EMPLOYMENT
TAX (2011).
241 IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OMB NO. 1545-1971, SCHEDULE H (FORM 1040): HOUSEHOLD
EMPLOYMENT TAXES (2011).
242 IRS, supra note 238, at l. 6(c).
243 Id. at l. 11.
244 Id. at l. 64(a).
245 Id. at l. 67.
246 Id. at ll. 12, 56.
247 IRS, supra note 241.
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knows her coworker has only one child could discover that this individual
claimed erroneous exemptions for an additional phony dependent.248 Where
such tax positions did not result in an IRS audit (again, that information would
be publicly accessible as well), individuals could discover that taxpayers whom
they know personally and respect had claimed abusive tax positions without
triggering government detection.
Behavioral Effects. Just as cognitive biases may cause individuals to
overvalue salient examples of detection successes publicized by the
government,249 they may have the same effect on individuals’ perceptions of
specific examples of the government detection failures. The salient examples
of specific, recognizable taxpayers who claimed improper tax positions
without facing IRS detection that would appear in a public-access regime could
cause individuals to alter their perceptions of the government’s ability to detect
abuse. If the media were to publicize the government’s apparent failure to audit
a well-known citizen, or if an individual were to discover this failure regarding
one of her own friends or neighbors, the availability heuristic250 could cause
her to perceive that the chances of government detection are not nearly as high
as individuals appear to believe they are today.
b. Weak Tax Penalties
A public-access regime would also likely enable the media to publicize
instances in which tax evaders were detected by the IRS but did not bear strong
criminal or civil tax penalties. As opposed to the specific examples of tax
penalties that individuals encounter today, the statutory and administrative
exceptions and standards inherent in these tax-penalty rules prevent the
government from applying hefty civil or criminal tax penalties in the vast
majority of tax controversies.
Weak Criminal Tax Penalties. The government pursues criminal tax
penalties against individual taxpayers in a minute number of cases.251 A
public-access regime, consequently, would likely reveal memorable examples
of high-profile individuals who participated in fraudulent tax schemes without
facing criminal prosecution. The primary reason for the government’s

248

IRS, supra note 238, at l. 6(c).
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
251 See TAX DIV., supra note 197, at 1, 14, 23, 25 (discussing the number of authorized criminal
prosecutions in given years).
249
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reluctance to seek criminal tax penalties is that it must prove in court that the
taxpayer intended to defraud the government.252 Thus, one explanation for the
government’s reluctance to pursue criminal tax sanctions against taxpayers
who have participated in tax fraud is that the available evidence may not
satisfy the heightened burden of proof.
Instead of pursuing criminal tax sanctions in many cases, the government
attempts to reach a civil settlement with the taxpayer or even creates special
amnesty programs that encourage taxpayer disclosure by removing the threat
of criminal tax penalties. For example, in September 2009, after reaching an
exchange-of-information agreement with UBS,253 the IRS created an amnesty
program under which taxpayers could voluntarily disclose their use of offshore
accounts and, in exchange, avoid the imposition of criminal tax-fraud
penalties.254 Within weeks of the IRS’s announcement of the amnesty program,
15,000 taxpayers participated.255 Even though some rich and famous
individuals probably participated in the amnesty program, tax privacy
prevented the media from reporting their identities.256
With public access to tax return information, however, the media could
generate vivid news stories of recognizable, high-profile taxpayers who
engaged in tax fraud but avoided the criminal or civil penalties by participating
in IRS amnesty programs. These examples would stand in stark contrast to the
government’s public announcements describing the convictions of wealthy and
prominent individuals who have hidden income from the IRS in offshore bank
accounts.257
Weak Civil Tax Penalties. In addition, a public-access regime would
provide the media with an abundance of examples of specific taxpayers who
committed civil tax offenses but paid low or no monetary tax penalties. To
252

U.S. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 142(b).
IRS to Receive Unprecedented Amount of Information in UBS Agreement, IRS (Aug. 19, 2009), http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=212124,00.html.
254 Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, IRS (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id=210027,00.html. The IRS announced a second special offshore voluntary disclosure initiative on
February 8, 2011. Second Special Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Opens, IRS (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.irs.
gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=235695,00.html.
255 Second Special Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Opens, supra note 254.
256 For speculation on this point, see Arden Dale, Rich and Famous Stay Hidden in IRS Probe, DOW
JONES FIN. ADVISER BLOG (July 29, 2010), http://financialadviserblog.dowjones.com/blog/stay-ahead-of-yourclients/rich-and-famous-stay-hidden-in-irs-probe.
257 See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (discussing examples of public announcements of
high-profile taxpayers who engaged in tax fraud).
253
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apply accuracy-related and civil-fraud tax penalties, the IRS must rebut the
taxpayer’s defenses that are contained in the Internal Revenue Code and the
Treasury Regulations.258 For instance, in response to an accuracy-related tax
penalty, which applies when taxpayers submit incomplete or incorrect
information on their tax returns, a taxpayer may avoid the penalty by
demonstrating that she had “reasonable cause” for claiming the tax position at
issue.259
Publicly available statistics show that the IRS frequently declines to levy
tax penalties against taxpayers who have failed to comply with the tax law or
that the IRS declines to apply the proper penalties. In 2010, for example, the
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, an organization within the
Treasury Department that provides oversight of the IRS, found that, in a
statistical sample of correspondence audits closed in the 2008 fiscal year, IRS
agencies failed to consider the application of accuracy-related tax penalties in
92% of the cases.260 Even though each of these audits resulted in the payment
of additional taxes by taxpayers of at least $5000, the IRS applied accuracyrelated tax penalties against almost none of the taxpayers involved.261 Another
study by this organization showed that, in 2007, the IRS failed to consider
accuracy-related penalties in almost half of its audits of sole proprietors.262
A public-access regime would likely produce examples of named
taxpayers, such as politicians, prominent business figures, and celebrities, who
claimed erroneous tax positions but did not pay civil tax penalties. These types
of wealthy and sophisticated taxpayers likely have greater abilities than others
to hire counsel that can help them avoid the imposition of tax penalties, either
by relying on one of the tax-penalty exceptions or by taking advantage of a
government-sponsored amnesty program. If the media had access to tax return
information, it could determine when a specific taxpayer had filed an amended
return to report previously omitted income that an IRS agent had discovered
through an audit, but had not paid a civil tax penalty as a result of this conduct.

258

See I.R.C. §§ 6664(c)–(d) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2003).
See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4.
260 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 198, at 5.
261 Id.
262 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REFERENCE NO. 2010-30024, SIGNIFICANT TAX ISSUES ARE OFTEN NOT ADDRESSED DURING CORRESPONDENCE AUDITS OF SOLE
PROPRIETORS 4 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2010reports/201030024fr.pdf
(noting that, in 129 of 298 correspondence audits, sole proprietors may have avoided assessments of tax and
interest).
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Public access to tax return information would also produce examples of
specific ordinary citizens who paid low or no tax penalties. Under current law,
a taxpayer who owes the IRS a tax deficiency, interest, and penalties may
submit an Offer in Compromise to the IRS to attempt to settle the total
liability.263 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, in fiscal
year 2005 cases where the IRS accepted the taxpayer’s offer, the taxpayer paid
an average of sixteen cents per dollar of tax liability, including tax penalties,
owed.264 Even though these statistics are available publicly today, the repeal of
tax privacy would allow individuals to see vivid examples of their friends and
neighbors who owed significant tax penalties but paid only a small fraction of
them to the IRS as a result of a successful Offer in Compromise.
Behavioral Effects. By promoting examples of specific taxpayers who
participated in tax noncompliance of varying grades but nonetheless failed to
pay substantial tax penalties, a public-access regime could cause taxpayers to
develop a more realistic perception of the tax-penalty structure. News reports
featuring celebrities and other prominent officials who avoided high significant
tax penalties, even when they committed tax fraud by, for example, hiding
income offshore or participating in an abusive tax shelter, could trigger the
availability heuristic and cause individuals to perceive that most taxpayers do
not face civil and criminal tax penalties. Further, the anchoring bias could lead
them to perceive that, even if tax penalties do apply, for most taxpayers they
are low or nonexistent and deviate from this low anchor only in extreme cases.
c. Tax-Controversy Concessions
Last, in a public-access regime, the media would likely focus on tax
controversies in which the government made legal concessions or entered
settlements to avoid facing uncertain odds in court. Reporters would also likely
investigate instances in which IRS agents made errors in applying the law that
were subsequently reversed by other IRS officials. These reports would
conflict with the strong examples of legal victories against taxpayers that the
government publicizes widely today.
Settlement Decisions. Even though the tax disputes involving specific
taxpayers that individuals see today overwhelmingly feature government
victories, in reality, the IRS regularly settles tax controversies and reverses the
263 Offer in Compromise, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=104593,00.html (last
updated Dec. 8, 2011).
264 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-525, IRS OFFERS IN COMPROMISE 12 (2006).
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positions of its field agents.265 The IRS Appeals Division settles over 85% of
all disputes.266 The Appeals Division may review a field agent’s notice of
deficiency after the taxpayer files an appeal with the IRS and determine that
the IRS’s legal claim is not strong enough to merit litigation in a public
forum.267 And as was discussed above, the IRS frequently creates taxpayeramnesty programs in which it agrees not to pursue litigation against a taxpayer
in exchange for certain information.268
Public access to tax return information would enable the media to publicize
those examples by revealing settlement agreements and instances in which
specific taxpayers paid the IRS lower amounts than those contained in the
original statutory notices of deficiency. There is reason to suspect that the
media would pay close attention to these settlements, especially when they
involve high-profile taxpayers. For example, in December 2010, the IRS lost a
$1 billion transfer-pricing case in U.S. Tax Court involving Veritas Software
Corporation.269 After the decision by the court, even though the IRS stated that
the court’s “factual findings and legal assertions [we]re erroneous,” it decided
not to initiate an appeal of the decision.270 Following this public statement,
news reports described how the IRS had conceded the issue in the case.271
Public access to tax return information would probably result in similar
coverage of IRS settlement agreements and decisions not to pursue litigation
involving specific individual taxpayers.
IRS “Mistakes.” IRS field agents also make substantive legal errors when
auditing taxpayers, and the IRS National Office reverses the findings of these
agents after hearing taxpayers’ appeals.272 In a public-access regime, these
instances involving specific taxpayers could also be expected to generate
significant media interest. Even today, when tax privacy shields the details of
265

See Fogel, supra note 205, at 1504.
B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Resolving Tax Shelters: By Settlement
or Litigation, Address Before the Chicago Bar Association Federal Taxation Committee (Feb. 25, 2003) (on
file with author).
267 See Fogel, supra note 205, at 1503–04.
268 See, e.g., Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, supra note 254.
269 Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 297, 311–12, 320 (2009), action on dec., 2010-05 (Dec.
6, 2010).
270 Action on Decision: VERITAS Software Corp. v. Commissioner, IRS (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-aod/aod201005.pdf; accord Amy Miller, IRS Throws in Towel on Closely Watched International
Tax Case, RECORDER (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202474787058.
271 See, e.g., Marie Leone, No Taxation Without Ramifications, CFO, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 37; Miller, supra
note 270.
272 See Fogel, supra note 205, at 1503–04.
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most tax returns from public view, news reporters tend to focus on real or
perceived mistakes of the IRS.
For instance, in 2010, IRS agents arrived at Harv’s Metro Car Wash in
Sacramento, California, to collect an outstanding tax liability from 2006.273
The taxpayer, Aaron Zeff, told reporters the amount of his outstanding tax
liablity: four cents.274 Regardless of whether the visit by the IRS agents was
justified, news media described the IRS agents involved in the incident as
“confused” and as having made a mistake.275 Public access to tax return
information, including notices of deficiency and settlement agreements, could
cause the media to publish similar stories that imply, rightly or wrongly, IRS
incompetence.
Behavioral Effects. Instead of becoming anchored to the view that the
government is always successful when challenging taxpayers’ tax positions,
public access to tax return information could cause individuals to relax that
assumption. The availability heuristic276 could even cause individuals to
assume that these sorts of government weaknesses are common. The media
appear to focus on stories that reveal even a slight appearance of government
mistake or misconduct,277 making it possible that these types of stories could
receive more media attention than the government’s tax-enforcement victories
that dominate the news today.
3. Would the Media Care?
An assumption underlying the discussion so far is that the news media
would publicize the specific examples of the government’s tax-enforcement
weaknesses that would appear in a world without tax privacy. This is an
important assumption because several empirical studies show that news reports
regarding tax enforcement have a much greater impact on the perceptions of
individuals than descriptions of tax enforcement by friends and personal

273 Bob Shallit, IRS Visits Carwash, Tells Owner to Come Clean over 4 Cents, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.
13, 2010, at B1.
274 Id.
275 Car Wash Owes 4 Cents to IRS, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/video/news/2010/03/16/n_irs_
taxes_car_wash.cnnmoney/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Four Cent Fiasco: Tiny Tax Debt Lands Sacramento
Car Wash in Hot Water with IRS, NEWS10 (Mar. 14, 2010, 12:45 PM), http://www.news10.net/news/story.
aspx?storyid=77240&catid=2; IRS Comes Knocking . . . for Four Cents, CBS NEWS (May 15, 2010, 4:13 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/16/national/main6303887.shtml.
276 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
277 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 273, 275.
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associates.278 As I argue below, there is significant reason to expect that public
access would cause the media to highlight instances in which taxpayers
participated in abusive tax activities but failed to trigger IRS detection or face
serious punishment.
Media Coverage Today. Today, the news media exhibits a strong interest in
the personal tax activities of prominent individuals. One example of this
interest is the mainstream media’s constant reporting of the IRS’s imposition
of tax liens on the property of high-profile celebrities. For instance, when
Martin Scorsese, famed director of the classic film Taxi Driver, was subjected
to a $2.85 million federal tax lien in 2011, the image on the front page of the
New York Post was a photograph of Scorsese atop the words “Tax-ie
Dodger.”279 Websites like TMZ.com and TheSmokingGun.com regularly
publicize the tax liens and other problems of movie and television stars and
politicians.280 During the weeks leading up to Tax Day, this type of coverage
only increases.281 It is likely that if a public-access regime revealed the types of
weaknesses described above, especially when they implicate high-profile
individuals, the media would publicize these examples widely.
Further, journalists appear to be very interested in specific tax controversies
that are not visible today as a result of tax privacy. In January 2011, Julian
Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, which publishes secret and classified
information obtained from anonymous sources, announced that his
organization had obtained from a former Swiss bank executive the identities
and detailed financial information of more than two thousand prominent
individuals, including “politicians and ‘pillars of society,’” who had used
offshore bank accounts to hide income from taxing authorities.282 When
Assange announced that he would publish this information within the weeks
278

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer
Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 502 (2007) (finding that the media play a large role in the
dissemination of stories on tax enforcement, which increases tax compliance); Robert M. Melia, Is the Pen
Mightier than the Audit?, 34 TAX NOTES 1309, 1310–11, 1311 n.3 (1987) (observing that the media play a
large role in the dissemination of tax-enforcement stories and overall tax compliance, whereas word-of-mouth
stories have less effect or even the opposite effect).
279 Tax-ie Dodger, N.Y. POST, Mar. 8, 2011, at 1.
280 See, e.g., Al Pacino—Targeted by IRS over $188k Debt, TMZ.COM (Mar. 7, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://
www.tmz.com/2011/03/07/al-pacino-irs-taxes-debt-kenneth-starr-monica-lewinsky-movies-actor-internalrevenue-service-debt/; IRS Files $350,000 Tax Lien Against Designer Vera Wang, SMOKING GUN (Sept. 16,
2010), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/buster/irs/irs-files-350000-tax-lien-against-designer-vera-wang.
281 See Melia, supra note 278.
282 See Ravi Somaiya & Julia Werdigier, Ex-Banker Gives Data on Taxes to WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2011, at B1 (quoting Rudolf M. Elmer, a former executive of Swiss bank Julius Baer).
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following his receipt of it,283 the news media generated intense speculation
about the potential contents of the release.284
Non-U.S. Experience. The experience of other countries with public access
to individuals’ tax return information offers another reason to expect that
public access in the United States would generate substantial media and public
interest. In the 1950s, Israel implemented a public-access system in which it
published registers containing the names and reported taxable incomes of wage
earners who earned more than 25% of their income from sources other than
wages, self-employed individuals, and corporations.285 The purpose of the
program was to subject underreporting taxpayers to “community censure.”286
The public-access program generated significant public attention287 but
ultimately was disbanded as taxpayers challenged the validity of their publicly
available tax assessments.288 As a more recent example, Norway publishes its
citizens’ tax return information on the Internet, and reports indicate that the site
receives heavy traffic.289 Each year when new tax return information is
released, the Norwegian tabloid press features extensive coverage of the tax
affairs of the rich, famous, and notorious.290 In addition, Norwegian citizens
themselves have been described as “treat[ing] the list like ‘tax porno’—
furtively checking neighbors’ or co-workers’ incomes.”291 Finally, in 2008,
Italy published the 2005 tax returns of forty million of its citizens online.292
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Id.
See, e.g., Chuck Bennett, Wiki Soon: Big-Name Tax Cheats, N.Y. POST, Jan. 18, 2011, at 29; Walter
Pavlo, Wikileaks to Disclose U.S. Tax Cheats—and the IRS Is All Ears, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2011, 8:44 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/01/19/wikileaks-to-disclose-u-s-tax-cheats-and-the-irs-is-allears/.
285 See HAROLD C. WILKENFELD, TAXES AND PEOPLE IN ISRAEL 131 (1973).
286 Assaf Likhovski, “Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
665, 674 (2007).
287 See, e.g., Tax Assessments Published for Self-Employed Earners, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 10, 1955.
288 See Likhovski, supra note 286, at 675.
289 See Elizabeth Davies, Frenzy of Snooping as Norway Puts All Tax Records Online, INDEPENDENT
(Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/frenzy-of-snooping-as-norway-puts-all-taxrecords-online-510577.html; Norwegians Drool over Fresh Tax Records, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/4318382.stm (last updated Oct. 7, 2005).
290 See Davies, supra note 289.
291 Ian MacDougall, Tax Porn or a Transparent Society? Norway Publishes All Tax Returns Online,
WATERLOO CHRON. (Ontario), Oct. 22, 2009, at 1 (quoting Jan Omdahl, a columnist for the Norwegian tabloid
Dagbladet).
292 Ian Fisher, Do the Rich Pay Taxes? Italy Tells All, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2008, at A6 (describing the
Italian tax return experiment).
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Within hours of launching the website, visits by Italian citizens overwhelmed
the website, and the government shut it down.293
Past Media Coverage. A review of past public-access experiments in the
United States provides additional support for these predictions. In the Civil
War period, when individual tax returns were open to public inspection, the
New York Times published a regular column that featured the editors’ analysis
of the performance of specific tax-collection districts at identifying abusive tax
positions claimed by citizens.294 In one column in 1865, the editors chronicled
their own discovery of abuses, such as one tax return where “a person returned
his income at $11,000, when his books revealed the delightful figuring of
$80,000 to his credit,” among many other “wonderful frauds” that were only
“discernable to the close observer.”295 Sixty years later, when tax return
information was again public, the Times published a list of wealthy individuals
who had paid no tax at all.296 The editors dubbed this list of citizens the “‘nontaxable’ list[]” and questioned why they had not been investigated for
“suspicious” tax positions.297
In modern times, especially as the public’s fascination with the personal
lives of others—whether celebrities or professional acquaintances—has only
intensified,298 a public-access regime would likely provoke even stronger
public interest and, in turn, greater news-media coverage than in the past.
C. Strategic Publicity and Tax Compliance
As tax privacy enables the government to influence the perceptions of
individual taxpayers by publicizing—with the help of the news media—taxenforcement successes to the exclusion of tax-enforcement failures, it may also
enable the government to influence the tax-compliance decisions of
individuals. The effects may vary depending upon whether one applies the
deterrence model of taxpayer behavior, which proposes that some individuals
attempt to weigh the expected benefits and costs of tax noncompliance
rationally,299 or the reciprocity model of taxpayer behavior, which
293

Id.
See, e.g., Our Internal Revenue: The Third (Brooklyn) District Complete, supra note 46.
295 Id.
296 Names of Wealthy on Non-Taxable List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1925, at 1.
297 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
298 Cf. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 66–85 (2010) (detailing the social phenomenon
surrounding the rise of social-networking websites, such as Facebook.com).
299 See infra notes 301–03 and accompanying text.
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hypothesizes that many taxpayers are willing to pay their taxes honestly, but
only if they believe that other taxpayers are paying honestly as well.300 The
strategic-publicity function of tax privacy likely enhances individual tax
compliance under both models of taxpayer behavior.
1. Deterrence
Tax privacy enables the government to publicize strong tax-enforcement
examples that may cause individuals to overestimate the government’s ability
to detect tax avoidance and evasion and punish noncompliant taxpayers; thus,
tax privacy may facilitate the government’s efforts to deter aggressive and
abusive tax positions. By contrast, producing examples of weak tax
enforcement against specific taxpayers could have the opposite effect on
individuals’ perceptions and tax-compliance decisions. As a result of the power
of examples and their effect on individuals’ perceptions, the strategic-publicity
function of tax privacy may bolster deterrence.
The deterrence model of taxpayer behavior is an appropriate tool for
addressing the tax-compliance decisions of individuals who consider the
obligation to pay taxes to be a game in which the prize is paying the lowest
amount of tax possible.301 Many tax scholars have argued that these taxpayers
attempt to act rationally when determining whether to pursue a tax-avoidance
or tax-evasion strategy.302 They explain that these taxpayers weigh the possible
expected benefit of claiming a particular tax position (the tax savings,
discounted by the probability that the IRS will detect the position) against the
expected cost of claiming the tax position (tax penalties and interest,
discounted by the probability that the IRS will not detect the position).303
By producing specific examples that demonstrate its tax-enforcement
strengths, the government often endeavors to deter specific groups of taxpayers
who contribute heavily to the tax gap. When the government announces
criminal prosecutions of individuals who engaged in abusive tax shelters or hid
income in offshore tax havens, the government attempts to deter wealthy and
sophisticated individuals. When the government reports its detection of
300

See infra notes 313–19 and accompanying text.
Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans.,
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1931) (1802) (observing that, to deter crime generally, the threat of punishment
must outweigh the benefit of the act); Becker, supra note 20 (same).
302 See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 845 (1998);
Raskolnikov, supra note 20.
303 See Andreoni et al., supra note 302, at 845; Raskolnikov, supra note 20, at 576–80.
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individuals who failed to report cash income that was not subject to third-party
reporting, it attempts to deter tax avoidance among a broad group of
individuals who operate sole proprietorships and small businesses. And when
the government publicizes the guilty pleas and criminal convictions of
individuals who have claimed tax positions that are clearly fraudulent, such as
those that claim zero wages or involve writing nunc pro tunc (Latin for “now
for then”) on tax returns as a justification for not paying tax,304 it attempts to
deter individuals who may be tempted to participate in mass-marketed,
fraudulent tax strategies.
The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may influence the taxcompliance calculus, at least in terms of rational taxpayers, in favor of the
government by increasing their perceptions of the two principle determinants
of deterrence: the probability of detection and the costs of tax
noncompliance.305 Imagine an individual who is deciding whether to divert a
portion of her personal business income into a Cayman Islands bank account
that traditionally has been subject to strong secrecy rules and, thus, has been
safe from IRS scrutiny. As this individual considers whether to engage in the
tax-evasion strategy, examples of celebrities and prominent businessmen who
have pled guilty to pursuing similar tactics using Swiss bank accounts weigh
heavily in her mind. These examples lead her to believe that there is a high
chance that she will be caught, causing the expected benefit of engaging in the
transaction to seem low to her. After assessing the expected costs and benefits,
the individual decides not to engage in the Cayman Islands transaction.
Salient examples of tax enforcement may also deter an individual from
engaging in a tax-avoidance strategy even if the offense featured in the
example differs from the strategy that the individual is considering. Consider a
taxpayer who is weighing whether to claim a tax deduction for charitable
contributions that the taxpayer did not actually make. Even though examples of

304 See IRS Announces “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams for 2006, IRS (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=154293,00.html.
305 See Becker, supra note 20, at 176 (discussing crime deterrence generally); Raskolnikov, supra note 20,
at 576–80 (discussing the application of the deterrence model to tax-compliance problems); see also Sarah B.
Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2009) (describing
statements about the probability of tax audits and other enforcement actions as expressions of “belief about
whether the event[s] will occur”); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 21 (1998) (finding that survey respondents were more unwilling to take
positions of tax noncompliance when criminal sanctions were at least possible); Gordon P. Waldo & Theodore
G. Chiricos, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to Deterrence
Research, 19 SOC. PROBS. 522, 533 (1972) (discussing perceptual deterrence).
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taxpayers receiving prison sentences for hiding income in Swiss bank accounts
involve a different type of tax evasion, they may still influence the individual’s
tax-compliance calculus. Salient examples of taxpayers bearing heavy criminal
or civil penalties may trigger the individual’s cognitive biases by causing her
to perceive an exaggerated probability of detection and heightened costs of
noncompliance in the case of any type of tax-avoidance strategy that the IRS
could determine constitutes fraud.
Studies have shown that salient examples of tax-enforcement actions
against specific taxpayers, especially those that involve criminal sanctions,
have a significant and positive deterrent effect. Alan Plumley, for instance, has
found a correlation between the number of criminal tax convictions and
individual tax compliance; his work shows that the prosecution of criminal tax
cases “has a highly significant and positive impact on income reporting.”306
Similarly, a study by Jeffrey Dubin of the impact of the IRS’s Criminal
Investigation Division on individual tax compliance found that criminal tax
cases have significant general deterrence effects and that the “the media play a
large role in fostering tax compliance.”307 Another study determined that,
compared to personal conversations about tax audits with friends and
associates, individuals are more likely to be deterred by examples of tax
enforcement reported by the media “because the media tend[] to focus on cases
where taxpayers go to prison or pay large fines.”308
The presence of vivid examples of IRS detection of specific taxpayers may
help create an individual’s distorted perception of the probability that she will
be subject to a tax audit if she claims an aggressive tax position. As discussed
above, in 2009, 1.03% of all individual tax returns were subject to an IRS field
or correspondence audit.309 In a study of individual taxpayers’ beliefs,
however, Harold Grasmick and Wilbur Scott found that 37.9% of individuals
believed they would be caught if they attempted to evade tax.310 Another study
by John Scholz and Neil Pinney found that individual taxpayers believed that
the probability that their tax returns would be audited by the IRS was 48%,

306 ALAN H. PLUMLEY, IRS, CATALOG NO. 22555A, THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE 36 (1996).
307 Dubin, supra note 278, at 502.
308 Melia, supra note 278, at 1311 n.3.
309 Fiscal Year 2009 Enforcement Results, supra note 210.
310 Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A
Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 222 (1982).
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were they to file false returns.311 It is not surprising, then, that, in the annual
study of taxpayer attitudes conducted by the IRS Oversight Board in 2010,
over 60% of individual taxpayers reported that “[f]ear of an audit” either had
somewhat of an influence or had a great deal of influence on their decision to
pay their taxes honestly.312
By enabling the government to provide concrete examples of strong tax
enforcement against specific taxpayers, which the media publicizes, tax
privacy may influence an individual’s tax-compliance calculus. Public access
to tax return information, on the other hand, could cause individuals to
perceive a lower probability of detection and lower costs of noncompliance
and, thus, could weaken the government’s deterrence efforts. For example, if
the individual who is considering diversion of income to the Cayman Islands
bank account were to see not only examples of taxpayers who received prison
sentences for engaging in similar transactions but also examples of prominent
taxpayers who engaged in such transactions and paid low or no tax penalties or
possibly escaped IRS detection altogether, her tax-compliance calculus could
lead her to pursue the tax strategy. Tax privacy, consequently, may allow the
government to deter taxpayers more effectively than it could in a regime in
which tax return information were open to public inspection.
2. Reciprocity
The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may also enable the
government to increase confidence among compliant taxpayers who are
motivated by the belief that other taxpayers are paying their taxes honestly.
Because tax privacy causes individuals to see examples of tax enforcement that
primarily show the government catching specific tax cheats and subjecting
them to harsh punishment, compliant individuals may perceive that few of
their fellow taxpayers cheat and that those who do face dire consequences.
Memorable examples of the government’s failure to detect or penalize
noncompliant taxpayers, however, could have negative tax-compliance effects
on individuals whose voluntary compliance is conditional on that of other
taxpayers.
Reciprocity theory proposes that some individuals contribute toward a
public good only if they perceive that other individuals are contributing as
311 See John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of
Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 497–98 (1995).
312 IRS OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 155, at 5.
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well, in effect reciprocating their good behavior.313 If these individuals
perceive that others are free riding off of their efforts by not contributing,
however, they may reduce their own contributions toward the public good.
Numerous public-goods experiments have demonstrated that individuals will
cooperate in collective-action settings only until they perceive that other
participants are not cooperating.314 Some social scientists have theorized that
individuals may respond to the perception that others are free riding by
reducing their own cooperation because “public-spirited contributors want to
retaliate against free-riders, and the only way available to them . . . is by not
contributing themselves.”315 A more basic explanation for this response is that
no one wants to feel like a chump for following the law while others cheat.316
Reciprocity theory thus could provide insight into the study of individual
tax compliance. In a self-assessment tax system, such as the federal income tax
system, tax compliance represents the model collective-action problem.317
Individuals in the United States appear to care about the tax compliance of
other taxpayers. In 2010, for example, when the IRS conducted its annual
survey of taxpayer attitudes, 44% of surveyed individuals reported that their
beliefs that their “neighbors are reporting and paying honestly” had at least
“somewhat of an influence” on their own decisions to report and pay their
taxes honestly.318 In accordance with reciprocity theory, scholars have argued
that some individuals will comply with the tax system as long as they believe
that other taxpayers are also complying.319

313

For discussion of reciprocity theory, see sources cited supra note 21.
See, e.g., James Andreoni, Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 891 (1995); Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 122 (1995); Christina M. Fong et al., Strong Reciprocity and the Welfare State, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY APPLICATIONS 1439, 1447–56 (Serge-Christophe
Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006).
315 HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 255 (2000) (citing Andreoni, supra note 314).
316 Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1453, 1487 (2003) (citing Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122).
317 Kahan, supra note 21, at 80.
318 IRS OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 155, at 5.
319 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 21, at 80–86. Only a small number of experiments have indicated how
individual taxpayers might adjust their own tax compliance in response to beliefs that other taxpayers are
cheating. As a result, Alex Raskolnikov has cautioned that “it is premature to conclude that reciprocity is the
primary cause of tax compliance.” Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 700 (2009). Yet as experiments in various collective-action
settings appear to confirm the real-world applicability of reciprocity theory, Raskolnikov does not dismiss the
potential relevance of reciprocity theory to individual tax compliance, concluding that it is “reasonable to view
reciprocity as just one more nonrational explanation of taxpayer behavior, alongside many others.” Id.
314
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The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may prevent compliant
taxpayers from altering their tax-compliance calculus in response to examples
of other taxpayers who have engaged in tax avoidance or evasion without
consequence. Take, for example, an individual who employs a full-time nanny
to care for her young children during the day. Even though the tax reporting
and withholding requirements for household employees are onerous and
expensive,320 the individual may comply with these rules because they are the
law and because she believes that society benefits from the taxes paid and that
other taxpayers who employ nannies bear this compliance burden as well. If
the curtain of tax privacy were lifted and this individual could see that many of
her friends and neighbors who also pay household employees do not comply
with the tax law by failing to report their nannies’ wages, withhold tax from
their nannies’ paychecks, or pay the employer’s share of payroll taxes,321 the
individual may feel like a chump for attempting to follow the tax law and may
stop complying. Consistent with reciprocity theory, tax privacy may cause
compliant taxpayers to perceive that their fellow taxpayers contribute toward
the public good by paying their taxes honestly even though this is often not the
case.
When the government announces criminal prosecutions of specific
individuals who have engaged in tax fraud or civil settlements with specific
high-profile individuals, it enhances compliant individuals’ perceptions of the
government as effective in detecting and preventing tax noncompliance. For
compliant taxpayers, vivid examples of the government’s tax-enforcement
successes may lead them to conclude that other taxpayers are probably paying
their taxes honestly because the government’s ability to detect abuse is so high.
Even though the publicly released statistics show that many taxpayers do not
comply with the tax law and escape government detection,322 the availability
heuristic may lead compliant individual taxpayers to draw these conclusions.
Further, as some of the most memorable examples of tax enforcement
against specific individuals involve extreme examples of tax noncompliance,
such as criminal tax fraud, compliant individuals might assume that the

320 See Lisa Belkin, Paying Nanny Taxes (or Not), N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 4:00
PM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/paying-nanny-taxes-or-not/.
321 See IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CATALOG NO. 64286A, HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE FOR
WAGES PAID IN 2011, at 2–7 (2011) (explaining taxation requirements relating to household employees).
322 For example, over 50% of non-farm proprietors’ income is underreported. IRS, supra note 230, at 13
fig.4, 14 fig.5; see also Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 483, 484 (2009).
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government has effectively deterred other taxpayers in their peer group from
avoiding or evading their taxes. The types of tax-enforcement examples that
individuals see today may cause compliant individuals to believe that tax
evasion is not an activity that their friends and neighbors pursue. This
assumption is most likely incorrect because their neighbors may have avoided
taxes improperly by fudging the amount of their charitable contributions or
claiming an inflated tax basis upon reporting a capital gain.323 However, the
representativeness bias324 may cause these individuals to develop a perception
of tax noncompliance that leads them to believe that their peers could not
possibly belong to the group of individuals known as tax cheats.
Salient examples of tax return preparation by an individual’s friends and
colleagues may also cause compliant individuals to believe that the
government is effective in encouraging other taxpayers to follow the tax law.
Every spring, individuals provide concrete examples of tax return preparation
when they say things like, “I can’t go out tonight because I have to work on my
taxes,” or when they line up at the post office on April 15.325 For individuals
who condition their compliance with the tax system on the reciprocal actions
of other taxpayers, salient examples of tax return preparation may cause them
to rely on confirmation bias to assume that other taxpayers are not only filing
forms with the IRS but that they are also reporting their taxes correctly (of
course, it is possible that their neighbors are filing tax returns that contain
improper tax positions).
While there is limited experimental data that links tax compliance and
feelings of reciprocity explicitly, there is support for the proposition that the
perception of cooperation by other taxpayers leads to increases in overall
cooperation. In one notable study from the mid-1990s, the Minnesota
Department of Revenue conducted an experiment involving the cover letters
that it mailed to individual taxpayers with their annual tax return forms.326 The
Department mailed several different letters to test subjects, but only one letter

323 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_
version.pdf (describing various efforts to increase tax compliance).
324 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 4.
325 Cf. Jen Chung, It’s Tax Day! Farley Post Office Open Till Midnight, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 15, 2010,
11:02 AM), http://gothamist.com/2010/04/15/its_tax_day_farley_post_office_open.php (advising readers to
get to the post office early to avoid the last-minute rush on Tax Day).
326 See STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE
EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS (1996).
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attempted to create the perception of widespread tax compliance.327 The letter
stated:
Audits by the Internal Revenue Service show that people who file tax
returns report correctly and pay voluntarily 93 percent of the income
taxes they owe. Most taxpayers file their returns accurately and on
time. Although some taxpayers owe money because of minor errors,
a small number of taxpayers who deliberately cheat owe the bulk of
328
unpaid taxes.

The study found that the state realized an average tax gain of $278 per
taxpayer.329 As a result, the study concluded that this approach exhibited “[t]he
most cost-effective potential for increasing voluntary compliance.”330
Government officials have confirmed that one of their most important
objectives in publicizing tax-enforcement strengths is to enhance confidence
among compliant taxpayers in accordance with reciprocity theory. Government
officials often make public statements like that of Eileen Mayer, who was then
Chief of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, who commented that
“[p]ublicity of criminal tax fraud helps keep the honest taxpayers honest and
also assures them that the system is fair.”331 Statements such as these reveal
that government officials acknowledge and take advantage of the power of
specific tax-enforcement examples to influence the perceptions of taxpayers
whose willingness to calculate and report their taxes honestly is conditional on
the voluntary compliance of other taxpayers.
III. IN DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL TAX PRIVACY
By enabling the government to influence individual taxpayers’ perceptions
of its tax-enforcement capabilities with the help of the media, tax privacy may
cause individuals to develop beliefs that are inconsistent with reality. These
beliefs, in turn, may influence the way in which individuals report their tax
liabilities. In the most negative light, one could characterize the strategic327

See id. at 48–51.
Id. at 51.
329 Id. at 25.
330 Id. Other studies show some positive relationship between individuals’ tax compliance and their
perceptions that other taxpayers share “norms of taxpaying morality and responsibility.” Michael Wenzel,
Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance (2): A Field-Experiment 22 (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Ctr. for
Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 8, 2001); accord Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms
About Tax Compliance (1): A Prestudy (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 7,
2001).
331 Coder, supra note 158, at 740.
328
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publicity function of tax privacy as a form of manipulation or distortion.332
Should we embrace tax privacy’s role in supporting the government’s efforts to
influence individual taxpayers’ perceptions, or should we reconsider this role
on normative grounds?
This Part argues that the government should exploit the strategic-publicity
function of tax privacy to increase voluntary compliance. It then responds to
potential objections to this position and outlines possible implications of this
new defense of individual tax privacy for recent public-access proposals.
A. Why Less Is More
Even though tax privacy provides the public with less information about
specific taxpayers’ tax activities than would a regime of public access, the
strategic-publicity function of tax privacy is justified. Below, I offer three
principal arguments in support of tax privacy and its strategic-publicity
function: it achieves its ends without sacrificing transparency, it is more
politically feasible than alternative means of enhancing voluntary compliance,
and it can strengthen tax morale among individual taxpayers.
1. Transparency
The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy enables the government to
promote voluntary compliance without sacrificing transparency, a normative
goal of any liberal democracy.333 Transparency requires the government to
share information regarding its laws and actions with the public openly.334
Government policies that lack any transparency may be illegitimate because
they prevent individual citizens from considering these policies in public
debates.335 While philosophers and legal scholars concur that there must be
limits on transparency so that the government can function, they nevertheless

332

See infra notes 350–52 and accompanying text.
As James Madison wrote in 1822, “A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.” Letter from James Madison,
former President, to W.T. Barry, Ky. Lieutenant Gen. (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103,
103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
334 For discussion of the normative basis of transparency, see generally Mark Fenster, The Opacity of
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888–910 (2006).
335 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14–15 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing that publicity allows
individuals to make an informed decision when choosing to participate in a society); cf. Fenster, supra note
334, at 895–99 (describing the democratic benefits of transparency according to contemporary transparency
advocates and classic liberal philosophers).
333
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agree that some transparency is necessary for the government to implement
policies with the implied consent of the people.336
One way to judge whether a government policy is sufficiently transparent is
to determine whether it complies with the publicity principle.337 In the original
formulation of the principle, Immanuel Kant stated that “[a]ll actions which
relate to the right of other men are contrary to right and law, the maxim of
which does not permit publicity.”338 Many scholars have interpreted this
statement to mean that a policy of the government is illegitimate unless it
provides enough information to the people to allow them to engage in
democratic deliberation.339 Nearly two hundred years later, John Rawls
adopted this principle but posed it in a more hypothetical manner.340 Under
Rawls’s version of the publicity principle, the government should only pursue
policies that it could defend if they were ever exposed publicly.341
Does the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy cause the government
to violate the publicity principle articulated by Kant and Rawls? As this Article
has demonstrated, the government reveals different types of tax-enforcement
information to the public in different ways. It catches the public’s attention
most effectively when it uses vivid examples involving real people to
emphasize its tax-enforcement strengths. It does not provide the public with
similarly vivid examples of its tax-enforcement weaknesses, and the tax
privacy rules encourage this result. But because the government offers the
public the opportunity to learn about these weaknesses through the publication
of statistics regarding all tax-enforcement activities and because it shares
information with the public regarding its communication strategy, I contend
that the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy allows the government to
satisfy the publicity principle.
Even though the government exploits tax privacy to influence perceptions
by publicizing its tax-enforcement successes, it nonetheless publishes copious
336 See, e.g., David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154, 192
(Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996) (stating that the most persuasive argument for publicity is that a policy or action
cannot garner popular consent if it cannot withstand publicity, yet at the same time, some issues are better left
to experts).
337 IMMANUEL KANT, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 430, 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. &
trans., 1949); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 66 (1993).
338 KANT, supra note 337, at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted).
339 See, e.g., STEPHEN ELSTUB, TOWARDS A DELIBERATIVE AND ASSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 69–70
(2008).
340 RAWLS, supra note 337, at 66–71.
341 Id. at 69–71.
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statistics regarding its tax-enforcement activities. The IRS Data Book, which is
publicly accessible and available online, provides the audit rates for individuals
and businesses within different income brackets explicitly and describes, in
aggregate dollars, the amount of civil tax penalties assessed and abated for
various types of tax offenses.342 This practice should satisfy Kant’s version of
the publicity principle, which requires the government to provide enough
information to encourage public debate.343 If the government did not provide
these statistics to the public and only publicized its tax-enforcement successes,
it would surely be guilty of disregarding the publicity principle. Without access
to comprehensive statistics, advocacy groups such as Citizens for Tax
Justice344 or the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse345—groups that
possess the sophistication necessary to interpret this information—would have
no ability to engage policy makers in debate over the government’s taxenforcement practices.
In addition to providing statistical information, the government is also
forthcoming regarding its strategic publicity of tax-enforcement examples to
influence perceptions. Government officials have commented publicly that
they purposefully litigate cases involving high-profile taxpayers and publicize
them using the media to deter tax noncompliance and enhance taxpayer
confidence.346 In 2008, for example, in advance of Wesley Snipes’s sentencing
for his conviction for willfully failing to file tax returns for several years,
government lawyers recommended that the judge apply a prison sentence,
noting that “[t]he parking lot next to the courthouse was filled with television
satellite trucks.”347 The government argued that the defendant’s celebrity status
offered the judge a “momentous opportunity to instantaneously increase tax
compliance on a national scale.”348 Statements such as this would satisfy
Rawls’s version of the publicity principle, which asks whether the government
policy could be defended if publicly exposed.349 In this case, the government’s
342 See IRS, PUB. 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2008 (2009), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08databkrevised.pdf; see also Tax Statistics—Produced by the Statistics of Income Division
and Other Areas of the Internal Revenue Service, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/index.html (last updated
July 27, 2011).
343 ELSTUB, supra note 339, at 69–70; KANT, supra note 337, at 470.
344 See CITIZENS FOR TAX JUST., http://www.ctj.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
345 See TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
346 See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
347 United States’ Sentencing Memorandum Regarding Defendant Wesley Trent Snipes at 20, United
States v. Snipes, No. 5:06-cr-22-Oc-10GRJ (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2008).
348 Id.
349 RAWLS, supra note 337, at 66–71.
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transparency regarding its practice of selectively publicizing specific examples
of tax enforcement could enable it to defend its use of the strategic-publicity
function of tax privacy if it ever were to become a focus of public discussion.
Some scholars have argued that actions that do not portray an event or
person accurately may be morally questionable as deceptive or dishonest.
Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser have commented that certain
actions may be morally questionable if they constitute “paltering,” which they
define (using a dictionary definition) as “acting insincerely or misleadingly.”350
As an example of paltering, Schauer and Zeckhauser describe a marketing
strategy where an advertiser sends a potential consumer an envelope without a
return address and marked “government warning.”351 Schauer and Zeckhauser
characterize this act as paltering because the advertiser intentionally endeavors
to mislead a consumer into thinking that the letter was sent by a government
agency so that the consumer will be tempted to read its contents.352
Because the government does not withhold tax-enforcement data or lie
about its contents, it can defend itself against claims that it acts in a deceptive
manner when it attempts to promote strong tax-enforcement examples to
exploit the cognitive biases of individual taxpayers. In Schauer and
Zeckhauser’s example of the solicitation envelope, the consumer lacks any
ability to determine whether the letter is really from the government without
opening the envelope, performing the marketer’s intended response. By
contrast, when the government produces an example of a well-known public
figure who has pled guilty to criminal tax fraud, the government’s published
tax-enforcement reports contain statistics that disclose the rarity of criminal
tax-enforcement actions.
2. Political Feasibility
Another reason to embrace the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy is
that it is a more politically feasible approach to enhancing voluntary
compliance than increasing either the actual detection capability of the IRS or
tax penalties. While such alternatives would promote voluntary compliance

350 Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Paltering, in DECEPTION: FROM ANCIENT EMPIRES TO
INTERNET DATING 38, 39 (Brooke Harrington ed., 2009) (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1305 (3d ed. 1992)).
351 Id. at 44.
352 Id.
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under both deterrence and reciprocity models of taxpayer behavior, lack of
political will makes both alternatives unlikely.
The IRS can increase its ability to detect abusive tax activities only if
Congress increases the IRS’s operating budget. IRS officials and other
government agencies frequently cite a decline in full-time IRS agents and other
personnel as an obstacle that prevents the IRS from detecting tax
noncompliance. From 1996 to 2000, a period when the IRS faced intense
scrutiny by Congress, the audit rate for high-income taxpayers declined by
70% and for low-income taxpayers by 67%.353 Although the IRS’s budget was
increased in nominal dollars from 2002 to 2011, in some years, such as the
2007 fiscal year, the budget was actually decreased when inflation was taken
into account.354 As these examples illustrate, political support for increasing
the IRS’s audit resources has been, at best, erratic.
Statutory changes that would strengthen the tax-penalty rules are also
unlikely as a result of political obstacles. As many scholars have observed, tax
penalties under current law are too low to deter rational taxpayers.355 Many of
the civil tax-penalty rules contain exceptions and taxpayer defenses, such as a
showing of “reasonable cause”356 or reliance on “substantial authority,”357 that
make them inapplicable. While Congress has occasionally enacted more
stringent tax penalties to target specific types of abuse, it generally has not
been willing to increase tax penalties or question the lack of their enforcement
by the IRS.358 As the Joint Committee on Taxation observed in a report on civil
tax penalties in 1998, because “policy makers are . . . more likely to hear from
taxpayers who are unhappy with enforcement actions,” they “face pressures to
set enforcement at levels lower than would be most appropriate.”359

353 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-484, IRS AUDIT RATES: RATE FOR INDIVIDUAL
TAXPAYERS HAS DECLINED BUT EFFECT ON COMPLIANCE IS UNKNOWN 7–8 (2001).
354 IRS OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 123, at 11.
355 See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339,
351–52 (2005); Raskolnikov, supra note 20, at 582–83.
356 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2011).
357 Id. § 1.6662-4(d).
358 See Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1907927.
359 1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND
INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING
AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 36 (Comm.
Print 1999).
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The political constraints on increasing tax enforcement and tax penalties
cause the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy to be an attractive means
of promoting voluntary compliance. Instead of depending on Congress to
increase audit resources or fortify the statutory tax-penalty rules, the
government can use tax privacy to produce specific tax-enforcement examples
that highlight its strengths, to the exclusion of specific examples of its
weaknesses, and achieve the illusion that the chances of detection and the
magnitude of tax penalties are high.
As an example of how the government might affirmatively exploit the
strategic-publicity function of tax privacy, consider the health care mandate’s
tax penalty,360 which Congress enacted in 2010 as part of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act.361 As a result of this legislation—assuming the
legislation is ultimately upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court362—starting in
2014, individuals will be required to maintain health insurance coverage,
which can be provided through an employer’s health insurance plan or
purchased by individuals directly.363 If an individual fails to maintain
“minimum essential coverage,” she will be subject to a penalty that, by 2016,
will equal $695 or 2.5% of taxable income, whichever is greater.364
The political pressures on Congress regarding the health care penalty365
caused it to enact a penalty that will be difficult for the IRS to enforce. The
enacted legislation explicitly prohibits the IRS from applying criminal tax
penalties, liens, or levies against individuals who fail to pay a penalty for
failing to maintain minimum essential coverage.366 Further, without third-party
reporting, the IRS may not be able to detect the failure by many individuals to
maintain minimum essential coverage.

360

I.R.C. § 5000A (2006).
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The health care mandate was found unconstitutional by the
Eleventh Circuit. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398).
362 See Ashby Jones, Nearly Everything You Need to Know About the Health Care Decision, WALL ST. J.
L. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/14/nearly-everything-you-need-toknow-about-the-health-care-decision/?mod=WSJBlog (announcing that the Supreme Court has decided to rule
on the constitutionality of several aspects of the health care act, including the constitutionality of the health
care mandate, with oral arguments to be held in March 2012).
363 I.R.C. § 5000A(f).
364 Id. § 5000A(c).
365 A sizeable number of Americans appear to fear the tax penalties that may occur if they violate the
health insurance mandate. See Health Policy, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/health.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
366 I.R.C. § 5000A(g).
361
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In spite of these limitations, the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy
could help the IRS encourage compliance with the health care legislation.
Consistent with the publicity strategy described above, the IRS could publicize
instances when it applied the health care penalty against specific individuals
for failing to maintain minimum essential coverage. As a technical matter, it
could achieve this publicity by seeking waivers of tax privacy from these
taxpayers in exchange for a concession regarding some other aspect of their tax
returns.367 By publicizing just one or two memorable examples of a taxpayer
whom the IRS penalized for failing to maintain minimum essential health
insurance, the IRS could cause taxpayers to perceive that its ability to detect
failure to maintain health insurance is significant. Meanwhile, the identities of
thousands, or even millions, of specific individual taxpayers who failed to
maintain health insurance368 yet escaped IRS detection would remain hidden
behind the curtain of tax privacy.
The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy, thus, could enhance the
IRS’s ability to encourage individuals’ compliance without waiting for
Congress to revise the tax-penalty rules or increase funding to the IRS.
3. Tax Morale
Finally, the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may have a
beneficial effect on tax morale, the “intrinsic motivation” of citizens to
cooperate with the state by paying taxes.369 Tax morale differs from the
feelings of reciprocity discussed above.370 While reciprocity refers to
taxpayers’ beliefs regarding the actions of other taxpayers, tax morale refers to
taxpayers’ beliefs regarding the actions of government. As Benno Torgler and
Friedrich Schneider have described the concept, tax morale is “closely linked
to . . . ‘the norms of behaviour governing citizens as taxpayers in their
relationship with the government.’”371 Citizens possess high tax morale when
367

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See Stephen Ohlemacher, Nearly 4M People Could Pay Without Health Coverage, WASH. EXAMINER
(Apr. 22, 2010), http://washingtonexaminer.com/news/business/nearly-4m-people-could-pay-without-healthcoverage (noting that around four million people could still lack health insurance when the penalty would
become effective).
369 Frey & Torgler, supra note 34, at 140.
370 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing reciprocity).
371 Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from
Multicultural European Countries, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 443, 444 (2007) (quoting Young-dahl Song & Tinsley E.
Yarbrough, Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 442, 444 (1978)); accord John
T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance: Tax Institutions and Tax Morale in the U.S., in TAX EVASION, TRUST,
AND STATE CAPACITIES 51 (Nicolas Hayoz & Simon Hug eds., 2007) (describing the “tax morale” concept).
368
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they believe that the government is acting in a trustworthy manner and
providing services and benefits in exchange for the tax revenue received.
Scholars have shown that tax morale affects tax compliance. In recent
years, tax-compliance scholars have demonstrated that countries with low tax
morale may experience higher rates of tax evasion.372 Other scholars have
shown that when tax morale is low, people do not find tax evasion to be
morally wrong and may not think badly of their friends and neighbors who
pursue it.373 Indeed, low tax morale may cause people to engage in abusive tax
activities themselves. Italy and Greece are often cited as examples of countries
with low tax morale, where tax avoidance or evasion is akin to a national
sport.374 Compared to these European states, tax morale in the United States is
high. According to recent surveys, over 95% of U.S. individuals either
completely or mostly agree that paying taxes is “every American’s civic
duty.”375
The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may enhance tax morale,
and ultimately tax compliance, in the United States in several important ways.
It may cause taxpayers to develop an overly optimistic view of the simplicity
of the tax law, the government’s consistency in enforcing the tax law, and the
government benefits and services that taxpayers receive in exchange for their
tax payments. Each of these effects is discussed below.
Simplicity. The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may cause
individuals to perceive that important aspects of the tax law are simple and,
thus, administrable. The specific examples of tax enforcement that individuals
see today showcase taxpayers who have committed clear violations of the tax
law, such as by failing to report cash income376 or claiming dead people as
dependents.377 These clear examples of tax noncompliance may lead some
372 See BENNO TORGLER, TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX MORALE: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 64–77 (2007).
373 See, e.g., Michael R. Welch et al., “But Everybody Does It . . .”: The Effects of Perceptions, Moral
Pressures, and Informal Sanctions on Tax Cheating, 25 SOC. SPECTRUM 21, 29 (2005) (observing that tax
compliance may be directly affected by an individual’s sense of moral obligation and civic duty).
374 See James Surowiecki, Dodger Mania, NEW YORKER, July 11 & 18, 2011, at 38 (describing low tax
morale in Greece); Sari Gilbert, Italians on Tax Evaders List. So What Else Is New?, STRANITALIA (Mar. 10,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.stranitalia.com/home/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37
(describing the popularity of the effort to avoid reporting income among Italian citizens).
375 IRS OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 155, at 2.
376 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 169.
377 See Alice McQuillan, Tax Returns of the Living Dead, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 9, 2010, 2:38 PM), http://
www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Tax-Returns-of-the-Living-Dead-90266732.html (describing the indictment
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individuals to perceive that failure to comply with the tax law is unambiguous
and, perhaps, even immoral. More importantly, the clarity of the tax offenses
that appear in the news today may cause taxpayers to perceive that the
government is capable of identifying taxpayers who cross a bright line between
compliance and noncompliance. Images of strong tax enforcement against
specific individuals, consequently, may bolster tax morale.378
A public-access regime, however, would likely cause the media to produce
examples of specific taxpayers, especially wealthy individuals, who have
engaged in complex, abusive tax shelter transactions that subsist on the
abundant ambiguity in the tax law. These complex transactions take advantage
of literal readings of the tax law and enable taxpayers to claim tax benefits that
Congress never intended.379 Although the IRS may designate these types of tax
strategies as “listed transactions”—those it believes are abusive tax
shelters380—the propriety of the strategies is often unclear.381 By allowing the
media and, by extension, members of the public to inspect individuals’ tax
return information, a public-access regime could generate examples of tax
noncompliance that are more difficult to define as tax evasion than are the
examples of tax fraud that taxpayers see today. Tax morale could decrease as
individuals question the government’s ability to define, let alone prevent, tax
noncompliance.
Consistency. The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may also
enhance individuals’ trust in the government by causing them to see specific

of twenty-six New York tax preparers for claiming $95 million in refunds by causing taxpayers to claim dead
people as dependents).
378 Some commentators, such as Dan Kahan, appear to believe that strong examples of tax enforcement
may actually weaken tax morale. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 21, at 83. The rationale behind this view is that
when the government reveals examples of taxpayers who have engaged in abusive tax activities, it may cause
individuals to perceive that other taxpayers are engaging in the same activities. See id.; Joshua D. Rosenberg,
The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV.
155, 199 (1996). As Leandra Lederman has responded, however, these examples more likely strengthen tax
morale by showing that the government has been successful in detecting and punishing abuse. Lederman,
supra note 316, at 1494–95.
379 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS
AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 130 (1999); Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83
TAX NOTES 1775, 1777 (1999); see also Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter
Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1667 (2009) (discussing overdisclosure as a method of tax evasion).
380 See Instructions for Form 8886 (03/2011), IRS, http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i8886/ch01.html#
d0e82 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
381 See Blank, supra note 127, at 543–46; Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L.
REV. 47, 52 (2001).

BLANK GALLEYSFINAL3

336

4/3/2012 11:56 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:265

examples of tax enforcement that portray the government as applying the tax
law in a consistent and fair manner. For example, when, in the weeks leading
up to Tax Day, the government announces dozens of criminal prosecutions of
specific wealthy individuals who have pled guilty to hiding income offshore,382
it may foster the perception that it applies the law equally to similar tax
offenses. Likewise, when the government publicizes its civil injunctions
against, and criminal investigations of, tax protestors or individuals who have
used cash businesses to avoid tax,383 it provides the public with assurances that
it deals with these offenders harshly and consistently.
A public-access regime, however, could detract from this image of
consistency by exposing instances in which the government has treated similar
tax offenses very differently. As the earlier discussion illustrated, a publicaccess regime could cause the media to publicize competing examples of
sophisticated taxpayers who engaged in abusive tax strategies yet paid low or
no tax penalties—or did not even trigger an IRS audit.384 Further, public access
could reveal specific examples of sympathetic taxpayers, such as single
mothers who erroneously claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and
were subject to tax penalties for noncompliance while prominent wealthy
taxpayers succeeded in avoiding tax penalties and, possibly, findings of
deficiency.385 And as the IRS is not bound by a duty of consistency to
taxpayers,386 public access could enable the media to highlight discrepancies in
the IRS’s decision to seek tax penalties in certain tax controversies and not in
others. All of these examples could weaken the perception of individuals that
the government applies the tax law consistently and fairly, and, in turn, could
weaken tax morale as well.
Services. Last, the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy may lead
individuals to perceive that the government is using their tax dollars to provide
benefits and services. As at least one tax scholar has explained, the perception
that the government is “providing valued goods and services with the

382

See supra notes 180, 187–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
384 See supra notes 251–57 and accompanying text.
385 For discussion of the magnitude of audit resources allocated to EITC audits, see Waste, Fraud, &
Abuse: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 100–03 (2003) (statement of Leonard E.
Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute). As Burman put it, “Although the IRS is doing many things
right . . . its preoccupation with EITC noncompliance is not one of them.” Id. at 96.
386 See Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an IRS Duty of
Consistency, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 317, 318.
383
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revenues”387 is critical to the creation of positive tax morale. When the
government publicizes its detection and prosecution of tax cheats, it does more
than simply deter taxpayers from cheating on their own taxes. It also signals to
taxpayers that it is capable of collecting the maximum amount of tax dollars
and allocating them to government programs.
A public-access regime could produce vivid contradictory examples,
however, that could alter individuals’ perceptions of the government’s ability
to maximize revenue collection. Public access to tax return information would
enable the media to report memorable stories of specific taxpayers who
engaged in egregious tax offenses but appeared to fail to elicit the attention of
IRS agents. For example, in 2010, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration reported that 1295 prisoners, including 241 serving life
sentences, requested and received $9.1 million in first-time homebuyer credits,
even though they were in prison during the period in which they allegedly
purchased their first homes.388 An increase in stories like this would diminish
tax morale by illustrating memorable instances in which the government
distributed funds not to provide valuable social programs or services but,
instead, to enable tax fraud.
As this discussion illustrates, the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy
may contribute to current positive tax morale in the United States by
preserving individuals’ trust of the government and its ability to deliver goods
and services. Without tax privacy, tax morale and, ultimately, individual tax
compliance could each decline.
B. Risks and Responses
Three possible drawbacks of my defense of individual tax privacy are that
it may represent a paternalistic government policy, encourage uninformed
387 Ronald G. Cummings et al., Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental and Survey
Evidence 4 (Leitner Program in Int’l & Comparative Political Econ., Working Paper No. 2005-22, 2005),
available at http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/docs/botswana.pdf.
388 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REFERENCE NO. 2010-41-069,
ADDITIONAL STEPS ARE NEEDED TO PREVENT AND RECOVER ERRONEOUS CLAIMS FOR THE FIRST-TIME
HOMEBUYER CREDIT 7 (2010), available at http://www.recovery.gov/Accountability/inspectors/Documents/
201041069fr.pdf. Another report indicates that, in 2009, approximately 45,000 prisoners filed fraudulent tax
returns with the IRS, many of which requested refunds, and that the government distributed hundreds of
millions of dollars to them in response. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, REFERENCE NO. 2011-40-009, SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS STILL EXIST WITH INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY PRISONER TAX REFUND FRAUD 1 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2011reports/201140009fr.pdf.
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public debate over tax reform, or create the risk of harm to the government’s
credibility. I respond to each of these possibilities below.
1. Paternalism
A potential libertarian objection to the strategic-publicity function of tax
privacy is that it encourages the government to act in a paternalistic manner
toward citizens.389 Libertarians, such as Richard Epstein, object to paternalism
in governance, contending that the “conditions for paternalism are not remotely
satisfied when the state wishes to impose its authority over adults of full age
and intelligence, no matter how great their . . . emotional flaws.”390
Libertarians could argue that, if the government misleads individuals by
showing them examples that cause them to overvalue the magnitude of tax
penalties or the probability of tax audit, the government may cause them to
adopt different tax-reporting positions—and possibly pay more tax than is
legally due—in response to the specific examples. Consequently, they might
argue that the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy impinges upon
individual choice.
Libertarians would probably sustain their objection even if the strategicpublicity function of tax privacy were recharacterized as “libertarian
paternalism.”391 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein have defined libertarian
paternalism as a “nonintrusive” type of paternalism where the government
does not restrict or dictate individuals’ choices but instead exploits individuals’
cognitive biases to encourage them to make choices that will make them better
off.392 In response to the claim that the strategic-publicity function of tax
privacy influences individuals’ perceptions without forcing them to fill out
their tax returns in a particular way, libertarians might respond “that there is no
sharp line between libertarian and non-libertarian paternalism.”393 One
consequence of this policy, they might argue, is that the government’s decision
389 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 36, at 355 (describing “paternalistic regulations” as those “whose main
purpose is to protect individuals from their own biases and excesses”).
390 Id. at 373.
391 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 5.
392 Id.
393 Should Policies Nudge People to Make Certain Choices?, WALL ST. J. ECONOBLOG (May 25, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117977357721809835.html (quoting Mario Rizzo in an online debate with
Richard Thaler). For further criticism of libertarian paternalism, see On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict,
Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2120–21 (2008)
(book review); Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108 MICH. L. REV.
913 (2010) (book review); and Will Wilkinson, Why Opting Out Is No “Third Way”: The Perplexing Banality
of “Libertarian Paternalism,” REASON, Oct. 2008, at 64 (book review).
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to display a nonrepresentative group of specific tax enforcement examples to
influence individual taxpayers’ decisions could cause the government to coddle
individuals by not allowing them to learn for themselves the true nature of tax
audit rates and tax penalties and make their own responsible tax reporting
decisions.394
A response to these potential objections is that the government does not
restrict freedom of choice when it influences individuals’ perceptions to
encourage individuals to comply with the tax law. Unlike decisions regarding
whether to invest part of their salary increases in retirement accounts or
whether to engage in certain potentially dangerous activities, like smoking,
individuals are not entitled to choose whether to pay their taxes.
The government regularly exploits cognitive biases to encourage
individuals to obey the law. For example, when a city places a sign in a public
park that states, “It’s The Law: Clean Up After Your Dog” followed by,
“Penalty Up to $100,”395 it exploits the anchoring bias of individuals by
causing them to focus on the maximum fine rather than the realistic one. When
a state police force places a sign on the highway that reads, “Surveillance
Cameras in Use,”396 it causes individuals to overestimate the probability that
police officers will detect their speeding. These actions are difficult to criticize
as intrusions upon individual freedom because they aim to encourage
individuals to obey the law.
Even if the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy can be characterized
as a form of paternalism or libertarian paternalism, the requirement to pay the
correct amount of tax liability to the government on time is not a choice at all.
Instead, tax compliance is the law, which is coercive by definition.

394 Cf. Jonathan Klick, The Dangers of Letting Someone Else Decide, CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 9, 2010, 8:43
AM),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/04/09/jonathan-klick/the-dangers-of-letting-someone-else-decide/
(criticizing libertarian paternalism generally).
395 Cf., e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1310 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (imposing a duty on dog owners to
clean up after their dogs in public parks, the violation of which is punishable by a fine of $100).
396 Cf., e.g., John Metaxas, NYC Wants to Use Speed Cameras to Catch Lead Foot Drivers, CBS N.Y.
(Jan. 10, 2011, 7:49 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/01/10/nyc-wants-to-use-speed-cameras-to-catchlead-foot-drivers/ (describing a New York City policy of posting cameras along roadways that could capture
vehicles’ speeds and take a picture of their license plates, which could result in summons being sent to
speeding drivers’ homes without any law enforcement stop).
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2. Uninformed Public Debate
Another potential objection to acceptance of tax privacy as a normatively
attractive means of encouraging voluntary compliance is that it could prevent
members of the public from engaging in informed debate over tax reform.
Public-access proponents argue that tax privacy may distort debates over taxreform issues by preventing members of the public and Congress from seeing
examples of specific taxpayers as they are affected by the tax policies at
issue.397 In arguing for public access to tax return information, Joseph
Thorndike has commented that “[t]he best way to evaluate the operation of the
tax system is to see what real people are actually paying” and that, if tax
returns were public, “voters [could] prevent tax favoritism.”398 In particular,
Thorndike and others argue that tax privacy may prevent voters from
addressing loopholes in the tax law and the relative distribution of tax
burdens.399
Loopholes. Public-access proponents argue that tax privacy prevents
members of the public from seeing examples of specific taxpayers’ tax
noncompliance and that society might benefit if Congress were to revise tax
provisions that encourage abusive tax shelters that result in inefficiency and
lost revenue.400 Because members of the public cannot see examples of
specific taxpayers who have engaged in abusive tax shelters to reduce tax
liability, the salience of these types of transactions and the underlying tax
provisions may be low. As a result, public-access proponents assert that the
public may have little interest in seeking needed reform of tax loopholes
because they do not see concrete examples of this problem.
Relative Tax Burdens. In addition, public-access proponents predict that, by
repealing tax privacy, we would expose memorable examples of wealthy

397 See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 112–14 (advocating publicity of wealthy taxpayers’ return
information for the benefit of public policy making); Linder, supra note 12, at 951–52, 975–83 (arguing that
millionaires’ taxable incomes should be public information to better inform the public debate); Thorndike,
Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at 148–49 (suggesting that publicity of return information could spark
“interest in fundamental tax reform”); Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691 (proposing
public release of politicians’ tax returns to increase awareness and enhance public debate).
398 Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at 148.
399 E.g., Linder, supra note 12, at 975–83 (advocating for publication of millionaires’ tax returns to
prompt a reevaluation of tax burdens among the wealthy); Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at
148–49 (promoting tax publicity to pressure Congress into closing loopholes).
400 See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 112–13; Linder, supra note 12, at 977–81; Thorndike, The
Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691.
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individuals who have paid very little tax.401 These examples, they argue, would
spur informed public debate over relative tax burdens and could lead to
legislative reform.402 Some proponents of tax reform attempt to provide these
specific examples today in spite of tax privacy. For instance, Warren Buffett,
one of the wealthiest individuals in the world, has been eager to reveal publicly
that he generally pays an average tax rate of 17.7% (on $46 million of annual
income) due to his income from capital investments, while his secretary pays
an average tax rate of 30% (on $60,000 of annual income).403 Public-access
proponents, consequently, would argue that, by embracing tax privacy to foster
tax compliance, salient examples of specific taxpayers’ benefits and burdens
would remain hidden, even though they could facilitate tax reform.
A response to this objection is that, if tax return information were public,
opposing interest groups in tax-reform debates could mine publicly accessible
tax returns for specific examples that they could use to influence the cognitive
biases of legislators and voters. Differences in the resources of the interest
groups involved and the media interest in the particular tax reform at issue,
consequently, would likely cause certain examples to gain more prominence
than others. To consider the effects of public access to tax return information
on tax-reform debates, imagine a public-access regime in which interest groups
attempt to influence public debate over the two tax-reform issues described
above.
Loopholes. Even though a public-access regime could enable progovernment interest groups that desire to reduce tax loopholes, such as
Citizens for Tax Justice,404 to produce vivid examples of real taxpayers taking
advantage of these loopholes to avoid tax, public access could also benefit
organizations that have opposing interests. The 1998 IRS Oversight Hearings
before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee provide a preview of the types of
specific examples that these interest groups could produce with ease in a
public-access regime.405 At the 1998 hearings, nearly a dozen sympathetic

401 See, e.g., Linder, supra note 12, at 975–81 (advocating the publication of millionaires’ tax returns to
provide the public with data and examples of potential tax evasion or the use of tax loopholes).
402 E.g., id.; Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at 148.
403 Tom Bawden, Buffett Blasts System that Lets Him Pay Less Tax than Secretary, TIMES (London), June
28, 2007, at 56.
404 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUST., supra note 344.
405 IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. (1998) (recounting the testimony
of several individuals, many of whom described disparaging stories about their own or others’ personal
encounters with the IRS).
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taxpayers, including a pastor,406 a single mother,407 and a former U.S.
Senator,408 described in vivid detail their own personal IRS “horror stories.”409
After hearing these specific examples of abuse, even though many of them
were greatly exaggerated,410 Congress eventually passed legislation that
hampered the IRS’s enforcement capabilities.411 In a public-access regime,
when the topic of closing tax loopholes reached the legislative agenda, antitax-reform interest groups could use publicly available tax returns to find
similar memorable examples that they could use to exploit the cognitive biases
of individual legislators and members of the public.
Relative Tax Burdens. Thorndike and others412 argue that public access to
tax return information would cause the public to see specific examples of
wealthy individuals who bear low tax burdens, such as Warren Buffet.413 It is
equally possible, however, that opposing interest groups could take advantage
of public access to tax returns to find salient examples of sympathetic
taxpayers that may distort the perceptions of voters. As Michael Graetz and Ian
Shapiro have recounted, in 2001, opponents of the estate tax carefully
presented specific sympathetic taxpayers to the public as typical taxpayers who
were burdened by the estate tax.414 For example, anti-estate-tax interest groups
arranged for Chester Thigpen, an eighty-three-year-old tree farmer from
Montrose, Mississippi, to testify before Congress that his tree farm “could be
worth more than a million dollars” but that, as a result of the federal estate tax,
his “children might have to break up the [t]ree [f]arm or sell off timber to pay
the estate taxes.”415 Even though individuals like Thigpen were not at all
representative of most taxpayers who faced the estate tax,416 the public latched
onto these salient examples, and they played a significant role in shifting

406

Id. at 293–97 (statement of Tony Alamo, Pastor, International Coalition for Religious Freedom).
Id. at 298 (statement of the National Audit Defense Network).
408 Id. at 182–85 (statement of Hon. Howard H. Baker, Jr., former U.S. Sen. from Tenn.).
409 Id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.) (“[W]e hear enough of these
complaints and enough of these horror stories that literally we want to do something about it and we need your
help to help us know what to do.”); see also JOHNSTON, supra note 211, at 145–46 (describing several more
stories that were told in the 1998 hearings).
410 See JOHNSTON, supra note 211, at 145–48.
411 See id. at 150–52.
412 See supra note 397.
413 See Bawden, supra note 403.
414 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH 62–73 (2005).
415 See id. at 62–63 (quoting Chester Thigpen) (internal quotation mark omitted).
416 See id. at 5–6 (observing that 97.7% of adults who died in 1999 owed no estate tax).
407
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public support to estate tax repeal.417 In addition to Thorndike’s predictions,
elimination of tax privacy could provide interest groups with salient taxpayer
examples that they could use to attempt to influence the tax-reform debate.
3. Government Credibility
A final potential objection to my defense of individual tax privacy is that it
creates credibility risks for the government. Research in the consumermarketing field has shown that consumers’ confidence in retailers may decline
if they feel that the retailer has engaged in duplicitous acts, such as by
presenting the price for a good in different segments rather than as a single
number.418 The strategic-publicity function of tax privacy appears to work well
as long as taxpayers do not question the government’s use of strong taxenforcement examples to portray its tax-enforcement efforts or levels of tax
compliance by other taxpayers. However, if examples of the government’s taxenforcement failures emerge that conflict with examples of its successes,
individual taxpayers may lose trust in the government.
This objection is not persuasive. Our tax privacy rules make it highly
unlikely that contradictory examples that could cause individuals to question
the government’s trustworthiness will appear. As this Article has
demonstrated, tax privacy prevents examples of the government’s taxenforcement errors or oversights from emerging. Today, few taxpayers
publicize instances where the IRS has made a mistake regarding their tax
returns or audits.419 Of course, when new presidents nominate individuals for
executive appointments, the public views salient examples of sophisticated
taxpayers who have failed to report their tax liabilities correctly yet have not
been detected by the IRS.420 But these exposures occur infrequently and most
likely escape most individuals’ memories during the interim.
It is more probable, however, that, if tax return information were public, the
government could face even greater credibility risks than it does today, when
417

See id. at 63–65.
See, e.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and
Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7–11), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1779382; Yih Hwai Lee & Cheng Yuen Han, Partitioned Pricing in
Advertising: Effects on Brand and Retailer Attitudes, 13 MARKETING LETTERS 27, 28–29 (2002).
419 For an isolated example of a taxpayer publicizing such a success, see Victor Fleischer, Fleischer 1, IRS
0, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov. 25, 2008), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2008/11/fleischer-1-irs-0.html
(describing tax law professor Victor Fleischer’s victory over an IRS determination of deficiency regarding his
personal “away from home” deductions).
420 See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text.
418
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tax return information is private. Even in a public-access regime, the
government would likely continue to attempt to highlight salient examples of
prominent taxpayers whom the government has prosecuted or penalized for
engaging in abusive tax activities as a way to deter tax evasion and bolster
taxpayer confidence. However, in a public-access regime, if the government
were to produce examples of its strong tax-enforcement actions against
specific individuals, such as those who used an offshore bank account to hide
income, the media could use publicly available disclosure forms to question
why other taxpayers who used similar tax strategies were not audited or
penalized.421 Such reports on inconsistent tax enforcement against specific
individuals could directly contradict the examples of successful detection that
the government deliberately attempts to create.
C. Implications
None of these potential objections to the strategic-publicity function of tax
privacy are powerful enough to outweigh its benefits as a means of enhancing
voluntary compliance. As a result, the primary implication of normative
acceptance of the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy is that individual
tax return information should remain private, except for instances when the
government engages in a public tax-enforcement action against an individual
taxpayer, such as civil or criminal tax litigation.
In recent years, tax scholars have proposed varying degrees of public
access to individual tax return information. I consider the implications of my
defense of individual tax privacy for some of these proposals below.
1. Full Public Access
Several tax scholars have proposed full or nearly full public access to
individual tax return information. Commentators such as Joseph Thorndike422
and Laurence Kotlikoff423 have argued that individual tax returns should be

421 Under current law, individuals are required to file disclosure forms along with their tax returns when
they engage in certain activities that the IRS views as potentially abusive. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
OMB NO. 1545-2038, TD F 90-22.1: REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (2011), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f90221.pdf; IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OMB NO. 1545-1800, FORM
8886: REPORTABLE TRANSACTION DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8886.pdf.
422 Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at 148–49; Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra
note 12, at 691–92.
423 See Bernasek, supra note 8 .
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publicly accessible to enhance voluntary compliance. Popular-culture
commentators have offered similar proposals.424 In response to concerns about
malicious uses of sensitive personal information, such as Social Security
numbers and addresses, they suggest that this information could simply be
redacted.425
While full public access could lead some individuals to refrain from
engaging in aggressive or abusive tax planning, it presents a significant risk of
revealing instances of tax noncompliance involving specific taxpayers. As this
Article has argued, full-public-access proposals should be rejected because
they would interfere with the government’s efforts to present memorable
examples of its tax-enforcement successes to individual taxpayers.
2. Partial Public Access
Other scholars, such as Marjorie Kornhauser, have suggested that partial
public access would satisfy the tax-compliance objectives described above.426
Under Kornhauser’s proposal, a taxpayer would file a publicly accessible form
with her annual tax returns that would contain her name, address, income,
capital gains, exclusions, deductions and credits, and marginal and effective
tax rates.427 Kornhauser acknowledges that the exact contours of the form
should be fine-tuned to maximize tax-compliance benefits while minimizing
invasions of personal privacy.428
While such a proposal would limit the scope of tax return information that
would be publicly available, partial public access could create even more
harmful tax-compliance effects than full public access. If individuals could see
only part of a specific taxpayer’s tax return, such as the amount of taxable
income, instead of the entire return, they might wonder about the reasons for
this figure. If the partial-access regime were to reveal that a prominent
individual reported surprisingly low taxable income, the media would likely
speculate or imply that the individual had engaged in a dubious or abusive tax
strategy. The history of public-tax-return experiments supports this objection
424 See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Andy’s Tip for the IRS (CBS television broadcast Apr. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4955238n. As the late commentator Andy Rooney stated, “I have
an idea how the IRS could get more money out of the tax cheaters, and it wouldn’t cost the government a
nickel. They would make tax records open to all of us.” Id.
425 See Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 12, at 149.
426 Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 111–16.
427 Id. at 115–16.
428 Id. at 116.
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to partial-public-access proposals. In 1924, when individuals’ tax liabilities and
names, and no other information, were made publicly available, newspaper
reporters questioned why certain wealthy individuals had paid little or no
income tax.429 This conjecture could detract from the strategic-publicity
function and hinder the government’s efforts to encourage voluntary
compliance.
Public reports that rich and famous individuals, identified by name, might
have reported low tax liabilities because they had engaged in abusive tax
planning could cause individuals to rely on the availability heuristic and
assume the presence of widespread tax evasion or, at least, tax avoidance.430
As partial public access to tax return information could generate even more
speculation of tax noncompliance than full-public-access proposals, it is far
less desirable from a tax-compliance perspective than its advocates suggest.
3. Targeted Public Access
Scholars have also proposed more targeted forms of public access aimed at
only certain types of taxpayers or tax information. Mark Linder, for instance,
has proposed that, to cause citizens to recognize the “widening differentials
between high- and low-paid occupations,” individuals earning $1 million or
more should be required to publish their tax returns.431 Other targeted-publicity
proposals include the mandatory public release of complete tax returns by
members of Congress or candidates for certain public offices.432
Advocates of these proposals acknowledge that targeted public access
would probably reveal tax-reporting irregularities, whether intentional or not,
of prominent citizens and public officials. For instance, following the public
display of the tax problems of President Obama’s nominees, when Joseph
Thorndike advocated for public access to the tax returns of U.S. senators, he
commented: “How many of these erstwhile colleagues would survive the sort
of intense tax vetting that these nominees have received? Not many, I suspect.

429

See, e.g., Names of Wealthy on Non-Taxable List, supra note 296.
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 148, at 207–08.
431 See Linder, supra note 12, at 977.
432 See, e.g., Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 12, at 691 (“I challenge the nation’s top
political leaders to release their tax returns. And I mean all our leaders.”).
430
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Maybe not even most.”433 A 2009 survey of sitting U.S. senators revealed that
several of them have made errors in reporting their tax liabilities in the past.434
Targeted-public-access proposals are especially troublesome when the
strategic-publicity function of tax privacy is taken into consideration. Because
proposals such as these affect the most recognizable taxpayers, they have the
potential to serve as some of the most salient examples of tax
noncompliance.435 Wealthy individuals are more likely to engage in abusive
tax strategies than other individuals.436 They are also more likely to possess the
financial resources necessary to avoid civil or criminal tax penalties if
detected.437 Again, even if targeted-public-access proposals revealed just a
small number of such cases involving celebrity taxpayers or recognizable
government officials, the availability heuristic, among other cognitive biases,
could cause individuals to conclude that the publicized cases are common.438
As a result, targeted-public-access proposals that would expose the tax return
information of the most prominent individuals should be avoided.
CONCLUSION
By examining the relationship of individual tax privacy and individual tax
compliance from a new perspective, this Article has offered a new defense of
individual tax privacy: that tax privacy enables the government to influence
individuals’ perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities by publicizing
specific examples of its tax-enforcement strengths without exposing specific
examples of its tax-enforcement weaknesses. Because salient examples may
implicate well-known cognitive biases, this strategic-publicity function of tax
privacy can cause individual taxpayers to develop inflated perceptions of the
government’s ability to detect tax offenses, punish perpetrators, and compel all
433

Id.
For Senators, Tax Questions Are Taxing, POLITICO.COM (Feb. 11, 2009, 4:27 AM), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0209/18696.html (showing that, of fifty-eight U.S. senators surveyed, nine admitted
to having made mistakes on their tax returns and seven admitted to having paid back taxes).
435 For recent examples, see David Kocieniewski, House Panel Finds Rangel Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2010, at A24 (describing the failure of U.S. Representative Charlie Rangel of New York to report rental
income to the IRS); and Josh Meyer, U.S. to Shelve Stevens Case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 2009, at C14 (describing
the failure of former U.S. Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska to report taxable income correctly).
436 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-493, ABUSIVE TAX AVOIDANCE TRANSACTIONS:
IRS NEEDS BETTER DATA TO INFORM DECISIONS ABOUT TRANSACTIONS 9 (2011), available at http://www.
gao.gov/assets/320/318337.pdf (observing that advice on how to structure abusive tax-avoidance transactions
is generally marketed and sold to wealthy individuals and corporations).
437 Id.
438 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 148, at 207–08.
434
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but a few outliers to comply. Without the curtain of tax privacy, by contrast,
individual taxpayers could see specific examples of the government’s taxenforcement weaknesses that would contradict this perception.
This Article has shown that the strategic-publicity function of tax privacy
likely encourages individuals to report their taxes properly. The strategicpublicity function of tax privacy may facilitate the government’s deterrence
efforts by causing individuals to overestimate the government’s ability to
detect tax avoidance and evasion and to punish noncompliant taxpayers.
Likewise, it may enable the government to increase confidence among
compliant taxpayers, enriching feelings of reciprocity by causing them to
perceive that most people pay their taxes honestly, even if this is not often—or
ever—the case.
Even though tax privacy may enable the government to create perceptions
that are not representative of reality, the strategic-publicity function of tax
privacy should be exploited to enhance voluntary compliance. I have offered
three principal arguments in support of tax privacy and its strategic-publicity
function: it may enhance voluntary compliance without sacrificing
transparency, it may offer a more politically feasible tax-compliance approach
than actual changes to the tax penalty rules or the allocation of taxenforcement resources, and it may improve tax morale by preserving
individuals’ trust of the government and its ability to deliver goods and
services. The primary implication of this analysis is that individual tax return
information should remain private, except for instances when the government
engages in a public tax-enforcement action against an individual taxpayer, such
as a civil lawsuit or criminal tax proceeding.
While increased public access to information is usually considered a virtue
of liberal democracy and good governance, this Article has argued that, in the
context of individual perceptions and individual tax compliance, less may
indeed be more.

